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1. “Greenhouse gases” are gases which remain in the earth’s lower atmosphere for long periods of
time after being emitted at the earth’s surface into the earth’s lower atmosphere, trapping some of the
infrared solar energy (heat) that radiates back into space from the earth’s surface, resulting in increased
warming of the earth’s lower atmosphere and the earth’s surface, much the way a human-made greenhouse
increases the temperature within such a hot house. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
3. Juliet Eilperin, World Temperatures Keep Rising With a Hot 2005, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2005,
at A1.
4. COMMITTEE ON THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE
CHANGE SCIENCE:  AN ANALYSIS OF SOME OF THE KEY QUESTIONS 2, 9 (2001).
5. Juliet Eilperin, 2005 Continues the Warming Trend, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005, at A2.
Scientists also report that worldwide temperatures in 2005 were either the highest or second-highest in
recorded history.  Id.  If 2005 was the hottest year worldwide in recorded history, then the preceding three
years were “the second, third and fourth warmest years on record.”  Eilperin, supra note 3, at A1, A7.
6. Eilperin, supra note 3, at A7.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Emissions from motor vehicles of toxic and hazardous air pollutants,
carbon dioxide, and other greenhouse gases1—emissions that currently are not
regulated under the federal Clean Air Act2—are receiving increasing attention
at both the federal and state government levels as government officials and
members of the public express increasing concern that these substances may
pose as much of a threat to public health and welfare as other pollutants from
motor vehicles which currently are regulated under the Clean Air Act.
Many scientists are reporting a “25-year trend of rising global
temperatures” and “other dramatic signs of global warming, such as the record
shrinkage of the Arctic sea ice cover and unprecedented high ocean
temperatures in the Gulf of Mexico.”3  Many people attribute global warming
to emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases resulting from
human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels by power plants and motor
vehicles.4  Scientists recently have found that the year 2005 was the hottest
year on record for the Northern Hemisphere, with temperatures approximately
1.3 degrees Fahrenheit above historical average temperatures.5
Many climatologists, along with policymakers in a number of countries, believe the rapid
temperature rise over the past 50 years is heavily driven by the burning of fossil fuels and
other human activities that have spewed carbon dioxide and other “greenhouse” gases
into the atmosphere.  A vocal minority of scientists say the warming climate is the result
of a natural cycle.6
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7. Carbon monoxide and PM-10 particulate matter (particulate matter less than 10 microns in
diameter) are pollutants that have been listed as criteria pollutants under section 108 of the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2000), because the EPA Administrator found that emissions of those pollutants “cause
or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”
Id. at § 7408(a)(1)(A).  Emissions of hydrocarbons/volatile organic compounds and oxides of nitrogen
contribute to the formation of ozone (a pollutant also listed as a criteria pollutant under section 108 of the
Clean Air Act), a photochemical oxidant that is a principal component of smog (which causes significant
harm to human beings, particularly in urban areas).
8. JOHN DECICCO ET AL., ENVTL. DEF., AUTOMAKERS’ CORPORATE CARBON BURDENS, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 2 (2005); Steven D. Cook, Carbon Dioxide from Cars Rises 25 Percent in 13 Years, 36 Env’t
Rep. (BNA) 1655 (Aug. 12, 2005).
9. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,931
(Sept. 8, 2003).
10. Id.
Motor vehicles (automobiles, light and heavy duty trucks, buses and
motorcycles) that burn either gasoline or diesel fuel have long been known to
emit into the ambient (outdoor) air large amounts of carbon monoxide,
particulate matter, hydrocarbons, and oxides of nitrogen.  These pollutants can
adversely affect public health, particularly when thousands of motor vehicles
are emitting such pollutants in a particular area.7
However, motor vehicles also emit large amounts of greenhouse gases
and hazardous air pollutants, but these emissions from motor vehicles are not
presently regulated under the Clean Air Act.  Carbon dioxide is the
greenhouse gas that is emitted in the largest amounts in both the United States
and in other parts of the world.  Although the largest amount of carbon
dioxide probably is emitted from stationary fossil-fuel burning electric utility
generating plants, the second largest amount of carbon dioxide probably is
emitted by motor vehicles that burn gasoline and diesel fuel.  In 2003
automobiles and light duty trucks in the United States emitted into the ambient
air more than 317 million metric tons of carbon dioxide.8
Motor vehicles also emit three other greenhouse gases:  methane, nitrous
oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons.  While hydrofluorocarbons are emitted from
a motor vehicle’s air conditioner, methane and nitrous oxide, like carbon
dioxide, are byproducts of the combustion of gasoline and other fossil fuels,
although the amount of methane and nitrous oxide emitted from a motor
vehicle is also influenced by the design of the automobile’s catalytic
converter.9  In 1999 carbon dioxide emissions accounted for over ninety-four
percent of transportation (motor vehicle) greenhouse gas emissions, with
nitrous oxides accounting for four percent, hydrofluorocarbons one percent,
and methane less than one percent.10
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11. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 61 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 64 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
14. Juliet Eilperin, Severe Hurricanes Increasing, Study Finds, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2005, at A13.
Other scientists contend, however, that the recent increase in the number and severity of hurricanes is due
to natural fluctuations over long periods of time due to changes in currents and salinity of ocean waters.
Peter Whoriskey, The Gathering Winds:  A Rise in Deadly Storms Since ’95 has Researchers Worried
About the Future, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2005, at A16.
The World Health Organization and some other scientists recently reported that global warming and
climate change caused by greenhouse gases each year may directly contribute worldwide to 150,000 deaths
and five million illnesses (including malaria, malnutrition, diarrhea, and dengue fever), with the areas most
at risk including sub-Saharan Africa, areas on the coast of the Indian Ocean, the coastal areas of South Asia,
and the areas of South and Central America on the coast of the Pacific Ocean.  Juliet Eilperin, Climate Shift
Tied to 150,000 Fatalities, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2005, at A20.  These public health effects of global
warming are disproportionately affecting poor countries which do not emit substantial amounts of
greenhouse gases.  Id.  Developed countries that emit substantial amounts of greenhouse gases may
experience increases in heat-related deaths in the future due to global warming.  Climate Change:  Global
Warming Linked to Higher Mortality, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) A7 (Nov. 17, 2005), at http://
pubs.bna.com/ip/bna/DEN.NSF/eh/a0b1z9e7r6 (last accessed Nov. 21, 2005) (“[M]odels suggest heat-
related deaths in California will more than double by 2100.”).  “Global warming—with an accompanying
rise in floods and droughts—is fueling the spread of epidemics in areas unprepared for diseases, say many
health experts worldwide.  Mosquitoes, ticks, mice and other carriers are surviving warmer winters and
expanding their range, bringing health threats with them.”  Doug Struck, Climate Change Drives Disease
to New Territory, WASH. POST, May 5, 2006, at A16.  West Nile virus, a disease first identified in Africa
in 1937 and that is spread by a common type of mosquito, first appeared on the North American continent
seven years ago and since then has killed more than 800 people and infected 21,000 people in the U.S. and
Canada.  Id.
In recent years the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the earth’s
atmosphere have been increasing as the result of human activities such as the
burning of fossil fuels and tropical deforestation.11  Many people believe that:
motor vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases contribute to global warming and that
global warming in turn is causing a host of serious problems, likely including increased
flash flood potential in the Appalachians, degraded water quality and reduced water
supply in the Great Lakes, sea-ice melting and permafrost thawing in Alaska, reduced
summer snow-pack runoff in the Rockies, extreme water resource fluctuations in Hawaii,
and rising sea levels combined with higher storm surges along the coasts of Puerto Rico,
the Virgin Islands and some eastern states.12
In addition, global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions may result
in “increased likelihood of drought, greater heat stress in urban areas . . . and
disruption to many U.S. ecosystems [including wetlands, forests, grasslands,
rivers, and lakes].”13  Furthermore, a number of scientists are contending that
recent Hurricane Katrina was more severe than otherwise would have been the
case because of increased temperatures of water in the Gulf of Mexico due to
global warming caused by greenhouse gases.14
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15. Pamela Najor, EPA, Groups Discuss Settlement of Lawsuit Seeking Controls on Mobile Toxic
Emissions, 36 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1341 (July 1, 2005).
16. Steven D. Cook, EPA Agrees to Deadline for Controlling Hazardous Air Pollutants From
Vehicles, 36 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1551 (July 29, 2005).
Motor vehicles, the leading source of emissions into the ambient air of
pollutants characterized as toxic or hazardous (because of threats of
substantial harm to human health or the environment) “each year emit[]
168,000 tons of benzene, 83,000 tons of formaldehyde, 23,500 tons of 1,3
butadiene, and 28,700 tons of acetaldehyde.”15  The United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reportedly has acknowledged that
these emissions of hazardous air pollutants from motor vehicles expose more
than one hundred million Americans to a cancer risk that exceeds the EPA’s
“one-in-one million lifetime benchmark.”16
Emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen and
particulate matter from both new and on-road in-use motor vehicles have been
regulated under the Clean Air Act since the mid-1970s.  Only recently has
public attention begun to focus on regulation of emissions from motor vehicles
of carbon dioxide, other greenhouse gases, and air pollutants characterized as
toxic or hazardous under the Clean Air Act.
In Part II, this Article first will analyze a recent court judgment upholding
a decision by the EPA Administrator not to regulate the emissions of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles under the Clean
Air Act, principally on the ground that greenhouse gases are not “air
pollutants” whose emissions can be regulated under the Clean Air Act.  It
concludes that the EPA Administrator has incorrectly interpreted the Clean
Air Act in this manner, and that the EPA Administrator should adopt
regulations under the Clean Air Act to regulate the emissions of greenhouse
gases from new motor vehicles.  This EPA regulation could be identical to, or
modeled after, regulations recently adopted by the California Air Resources
Board which will require the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles sold in California beginning with the 2009 model year.
The Article in Part III then analyzes California’s regulations that will
require reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
beginning with the 2009 model year.  This Part concludes that both the Clean
Air Act and the federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act’s Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards preempt California and other states
from regulating the emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
from new motor vehicles, unless the EPA Administrator grants California a
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17. The case of Sierra Club v. EPA, 325 F.3d 374 (D.C. Cir. 2003), points out that under the Clean
Air Act the EPA only has authority “[i]n a small number of cases” to control emissions from in-use on-road
motor vehicles.  These situations include authorizing the EPA to issue regulations for the “control of
rebuilding practices” for heavy duty engines per 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(D), and for retrofitting certain
urban buses under 42 U.S.C. § 7554(d).  It does not authorize the EPA Administrator to adopt regulations
to control emissions of greenhouse gases from in-use on-road passenger automobiles and other categories
of in-use on-road motor vehicles.  Sierra Club, 325 F.3d at 381-82.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
19. Sierra Club v. EPA, 325 F.3d 374, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
waiver under the Clean Air Act.  The EPA Administrator is unlikely to grant
this waiver, even though the Clean Air Act appears to require him to do so.
Part IV examines state and local regulation of greenhouse gas emissions
from in-use on-road motor vehicles, concluding that they are not preempted
by the Clean Air Act.  However, state and local governments are unlikely to
exercise this authority because those vehicles would have to have their
highway speeds or mileage reduced or undergo expensive retrofitting in order
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
Parts V and VI analyze the authority of the EPA and the states under the
Clean Air Act to establish emission standards for toxic and hazardous air
pollutants emitted from new and in-use on-road motor vehicles.  This section
concludes that although the EPA has declined to characterize carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases as Clean Air Act hazardous air pollutants, the
EPA is required to adopt standards under the Clean Air Act to regulate
emissions from new motor vehicles of other pollutants that are characterized
as toxic and hazardous air pollutants.  The Article concludes in Part VII that
states are preempted by the Clean Air Act from regulating emissions of
hazardous air pollutants from new motor vehicles, although states have
authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate the emissions of hazardous air
pollutants from in-use on-road motor vehicles.
II.   EPA’S DECISION NOT TO REGULATE CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS
FROM NEW MOTOR VEHICLES
Although the Clean Air Act does not give the EPA nor the EPA
Administrator any authority to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from
in-use on-road motor vehicles or to require owners or users of in-use on-road
motor vehicles to undertake actions to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases
from those vehicles,17 section 202(a)(1)18 of the Clean Air Act does give the
EPA Administrator “general authorization” to adopt regulations to control
emissions of air pollutants from new motor vehicles.19
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20. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
21. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8,
2003).
22. Id. at 52,925.
23. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh’g denied, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
26560 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc denied, 433 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 2006 U.S.
LEXIS 4910 (U.S. June 26, 2006) (No. 05-1120).  Judge Tatel, joined by Judge Rogers, dissented from the
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, arguing that the issue of global warming raised by the case
presents an issue of exceptional importance that makes en banc review appropriate and that “the panel’s
judgment permitted the EPA to consider policy matters unconnected to the standard set by Clean Air Act
section 202(a)(1) . . . and to ignore record evidence of impending public harm and to refuse altogether to
assess related risks.”  433 F.3d at 67-68.
24. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
25. 42 U.S.C § 7521(b) (2000).  Section 202(b) established specific numerical emissions standards,
expressed in terms of grams of pollutants emitted per vehicle mile, for carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons and
oxides of nitrogen for certain model year new motor vehicles and engines.
However, the EPA Administrator in late 2003 denied a petition requesting
that the EPA adopt standards under section 202(a)(1)20 of the Clean Air Act
to regulate the emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases from
new motor vehicles, on the grounds that he did not have authority under
section 202(a)(1) to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles and that, even if he did have such statutory authority, he did not
believe that it was appropriate to do so at the time21.  In reaching this decision,
the EPA Administrator followed a memorandum of the EPA’s General
Counsel, in which the Counsel concluded that the Clean Air Act “does not
authorize regulation to address climate change,” and withdrew a 1998
memorandum by a previous EPA General Counsel that reached a contrary
conclusion.22
In response to a judicial challenge to this EPA decision that was brought
by twelve states, three cities, one American territory, and a number of
environmental organizations, a majority of a divided three judge panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held, in
Massachusetts v. EPA,23 that the EPA Administrator properly exercised his
discretion under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act in denying this
petition.24
Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act provides that, except as otherwise
provided by section 202(b),25 the EPA Administrator:
shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) . . . standards applicable to
the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
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26. Id. at § 7521(a)(1).  For light duty vehicles, light duty vehicle engines, and light duty trucks (up
to 3,750 LVW and up to 6,000 lbs. GWR), “useful life” is defined as a period of use of five years or fifty
thousand miles (or the equivalent), whichever occurs first, except that “useful life” is defined as the period
of ten years or one hundred thousand miles (or the equivalent), whichever occurs first, in the case of any
requirement of section 202 of the Clean Air Act which first becomes applicable after November 15, 1990.
Id. at § 7521(d).  The “useful life” for any other motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine (other than
motorcycles or motorcycle engines) is the same as for light duty vehicles, unless the EPA Administrator
determines that a greater period of use or mileage is appropriate.  The EPA Administrator is to determine
the period of use for the “useful life” for any motorcycle or motorcycle engine.  Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 7550(3).
28. Under this definition, a vehicle or engine no longer is new when it leaves a retail showroom after
being sold to the ultimate user.  Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  In the
case of imported vehicles or engines, the terms “new motor vehicle” and “new motor vehicle engine” are
defined as ones “manufactured after the effective date of a regulation issued under section [202 of the Clean
Air Act] which is applicable to such vehicle or engine (or which would be applicable to such vehicle or
engine had it been manufactured for importation into the United States).”  42 U.S.C. § 7550(3).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
30. Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h).
32. Id.
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.  Such standards shall
be applicable to such vehicles and engines for their useful life.26
Except with respect to imported vehicles or engines, the terms “new motor
vehicle” and “new motor vehicle engine” are defined by section 216(3)27 of
the Clean Air Act as those for which “the equitable or legal title to which has
never been transferred to the ultimate purchaser.”28
Section 302(g)29 of the Clean Air Act further provides that “[t]he term ‘air
pollutant’ means any air pollution agent or combination of such agents,
including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or
matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”30  Section
302(h)31 provides that:
[a]ll language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is not limited to, effects on
soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility,
and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as
well as effects on economic values and personal comfort and well-being, whether caused
by transformation, conversion, or combination with other pollutants.32
Section 202(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, however, does not specify either
the level at which the EPA Administrator should set a standard for a particular
pollutant under the section or the substantive criteria that he should consider
in setting a standard for a particular air pollutant.  Although section 202
specifies the level at which standards for different classes of motor vehicles
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33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521(a)(3), (b), (g), (h), (i), (j), (f), (n).
34. Section 202 specifies emission standards for oxides of nitrogen (which include nitrous oxide)
for specified model years.  Section 206 establishes a system for the testing of prototypes of new motor
vehicles and new motor vehicle engines, and of new motor vehicles and engines under production on
assembly lines, to determine if they comply with section 202 standards and EPA regulations promulgated
under section 202.  If the EPA determines that a tested prototype complies with the section 202 standards,
it issues a certificate of conformity for that vehicle or engine to the manufacturer.  42 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1).
The sale of a new motor vehicle or engine is unlawful without such a certificate of conformity.  42 U.S.C.
§ 7522(a)(1).  Section 207 of the Clean Air Act imposes defect and performance warranties on
manufacturers of new motor vehicles and engines.  42 U.S.C. § 7541; Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA,
627 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  The defect warranty, 42 U.S.C. § 7541(a), requires
manufacturers to warrant to purchasers that each new motor vehicle or engine is designed, manufactured
and equipped to conform to section 202 standards and is free of defects in materials and workmanship
which would cause a motor vehicle or engine to fail to conform to the standards for its useful life (as
defined under section 202(d) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(d)).  The performance warranty, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7541(b), requires a manufacturer to be responsible for the costs of remedying any failure of an emission
control device or system in the vehicle or engine that results in a failure to conform with section 202
standards during the warranty period defined by section 207(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7541(i), if the vehicle or engine
has been maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s written maintenance instructions required by
section 207(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7541(c)(3).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2).
should be set for some specified model years for emissions of hydrocarbons,
carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen, and particulate matter,33 section 202
does not specify the level at which the EPA Administrator should set new
motor vehicle emissions standards for carbon dioxide or other greenhouse
gases (other than nitrous oxides).34
However, since the EPA Administrator is required to set standards under
section 202(a)(1) for emissions of a air pollutants from new motor vehicles
which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, section
202(a)(1) should be interpreted as implicitly requiring him to set a standard
for emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases at a level that will
not endanger public health or welfare, taking into account the availability of
requisite technology and the costs of compliance with the standard.
A section 202(a)(1) standard for emissions of greenhouse gases from new
motor vehicles should be a standard that can be met with available technology
and at a reasonable cost, because section 202(a)(2) provides that any “[a]ny
regulation prescribed under [section 202(a)(1)] (and any revision thereof)
shall take effect after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to
permit the development of the requisite technology, giving appropriate
consideration to the cost of compliance within such period.”35
One basis for the EPA’s rejection of the petition, seeking to have the EPA
set standards under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act for emissions of
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36. Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,928
(Sept. 8, 2003).
37. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
38. Id. at 58.
39. Id. at 58-59.  The four petitions that were dismissed challenged the memorandum of the EPA’s
General Counsel upon which the EPA Administrator had relied in denying the petition for rulemaking under
section 202(a)(1).  Id. at 54.  Judge Randolph indicated that this memorandum of the EPA General Counsel
was not “final action” of the EPA Administrator that was subject to judicial review under section 307(b)(1),
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), of the Clean Air Act.  415 F.3d at 54.
Judge Randolph also discussed whether any of the petitioners had standing to bring the challenge to
the EPA Administrator’s denial of the petition for rulemaking.  415 F.3d at 55-57.  However, “Judge
Randolph [did] not resolve whether petitioners [had] standing.”  Id. at 61 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 59-60 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment).
41. Id. at 60, 61.
42. 415 F.3d at 61-62, 67-68 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 62, 81, 82.
44. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
carbon dioxide from new motor vehicles, was that the EPA does not have
statutory authority under section 202(a)(1) to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles because emissions of greenhouse gases
(such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides and hydrofluorocarbons) are
not emissions of “air pollutants” within the meaning of section 202(a)(1) of
the Clean Air Act.36
Judge Randolph held in Massachusetts v. EPA that the EPA
Administrator properly exercised his discretion in denying the petition.  He
assumed “arguendo that EPA has statutory authority to regulate greenhouse
gases from new motor vehicles,”37 but held that “the EPA Administrator
properly exercised his discretion under § 202(a)(1) [of the Clean Air Act] in
denying the petition for rulemaking”38 and therefore denied four of the
petitions for review of the EPA Administrator’s decision and dismissed four
other petitions for review of the EPA Administrator’s decision.39  Judge
Sentelle dissented in part, in Massachusetts v. EPA, on the ground that the
petitioners did not have standing to sue40 but he concurred in the judgment to
deny four petitions for review and to dismiss four others.41
In dissent, however, Judge Tatel asserted that the EPA does have statutory
authority under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act to set standards for
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles42 and that the EPA
improperly exercised its discretion under section 202(a)(1) in deciding not to
set standards for carbon dioxide emissions from new motor vehicles.43
Judge Tatel, citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council,44 initially noted that in interpreting how a federal statute applies to
“the precise question at issue” a court must give effect to the intention of
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45. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 67 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000).
47. 415 F.3d at 67 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
48. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,928
(Sept. 8, 2003).
49. 415 F.3d at 67 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7403(g).
51. Id.
52. Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,926.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 7403(g).
Congress on that question, with the inquiry beginning with the statute’s plain
language.45  He then reasoned that the “exceedingly broad language” of the
Clean Air Act’s previously-quoted definition of “air pollutant” (in section
302(g)46 of the Clean Air Act) “plainly covers [greenhouse gases] emitted
from motor vehicles:  they are ‘physical [and] chemical . . . substances or
matter . . . emitted into . . . the ambient air.’”47  Judge Tatel did not mention
the EPA Administrator’s argument48 that in order for a substance to be an “air
pollutant” under section 302(g)’s definition “it must be an ‘agent’ of ‘air
pollution.’”  However, the EPA Administrator did not explain in his decision
how he defines “agent” and why carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
are not “agents” of “air pollution” within the meaning of section 302(g) of the
Clean Air Act.
In support of his conclusion that greenhouse gases plainly are “air
pollutants” under the Clean Air Act, Judge Tatel also noted49 that section
103(g),50 added to the Clean Air Act in 1990, “explicitly included [carbon
dioxide] in a partial list of ‘air pollutants,’” in a provision instructing the EPA
Administrator to conduct research on “nonregulatory strategies and
technologies for preventing or reducing multiple air pollutants, including
sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, heavy metals, PM-10 (particulate matter),
carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide, from stationary sources, including
fossil fuel power plants.”51  Judge Tatel, however, did not mention, as did the
EPA Administrator52 in his decision not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, that section 103(g) provides that
“[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize the imposition on
any person of air pollution control requirements.”53  This provision, however,
does not prohibit the EPA Administrator from imposing carbon dioxide air
pollution control requirements under other sections of the Clean Air Act.
On the basis of this analysis of the plain language of the Clean Air Act,
Judge Tatel reasoned that both a court and an agency:
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54. 415 F.3d at 67-68 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,
253-54 (1992)) (omissions in original).
55. Judge Tatel had cited Chevron earlier in his dissent for the proposition that “if a court,
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the
precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”  415 F.3d at 67 (citing Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
56. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
58. Id. at 843 n.9.
59. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Thus if apparently plain
language compels an ‘odd result,’ the court may refer to evidence of legislative intent other than the text
itself, such as the legislative history. Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989)
(quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989)).”).
60. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
[f]aced with such language . . . would normally end the analysis here and conclude that
[greenhouse gases] are “air pollutants,” since “we ‘must presume that a legislature says
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says . . . .  When the words of a
statute are unambiguous . . . this first canon is also the last:  judicial inquiry is
complete.’”54
Judge Tatel added that this analysis is “what courts typically call Chevron step
one.”55
Judge Tatel is correct that a court must follow the clear and unambiguous
language in a federal statute, because under Chevron56 “[i]f the intent of
Congress is clear [as to whether a federal statute addresses the precise
question at issue in a case], that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency [which administers the statute], must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”57  Under this principle, which
often is referred to as Chevron step one, a court may determine if a statute is
clear and unambiguous on the basis of both its plain language and the
“traditional tools of statutory construction,”58 including evidence of legislative
intent such as that found in a statute’s legislative history.59  If the court finds
that Congress’s intent as to a statute’s application to a precise question is clear
and unambiguous, the court must follow this clear and unambiguous
Congressional intent and is not permitted to follow a differing interpretation
of the statute by the administrative agency charged with enforcement of the
statute.  However, if the court finds that the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the court, under an approach referred to as
Chevron step two, is required to follow the administrative agency’s
interpretation of the statute if that interpretation is expressed in a formal
agency rule or formal adjudication decision60 and is a reasonable interpretation
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61. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
62. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Conn.
Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)) (omissions in original).
63. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 72.
64. Id. at 71.
65. Id. at 68 (quoting Respondent’s Brief at 55 (No. 03-1361)).
66. Id. (quoting Respondent’s Brief at 25-26 (No. 03-1361)).
67. 415 F.3d at 68 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032,
1041 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
of the silent or ambiguous statute, taking into account the purposes and
structure of the statute.61
Judge Tatel correctly found under Chevron step one that carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases are “air pollutants” under section 302(g) and
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, because the “exceedingly broad language [of
section 302(g)’s definition of “air pollutant”] plainly covers [greenhouse
gases] emitted from motor vehicles:  they are ‘physical [and] chemical . . .
substances or matter . . . emitted into . . . the ambient air.’”62  As Judge Tatel
added later in his dissent, “section 103(g) [of the Clean Air Act] explicitly
calls [carbon dioxide] an ‘air pollutant,’”63 and “Congress [in the Clean Air
Act] gave EPA broad authority to regulate all harmful pollutants, as section
202(a)(1)’s text makes clear.  Congress did so intentionally, deeming it ‘not
appropriate to exempt certain pollutants’ from the Act’s ‘comprehensive
protections.’”64  Consequently, because Congress has clearly expressed its
intent, in the plain language and legislative history of the Clean Air Act, that
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are “air pollutants” for purposes
of section 202(a)(1), a court is required by the Chevron step one doctrine to
follow Congress’s clearly expressed intent and to disregard an administrative
agency’s differing interpretation of the statute.
Nevertheless, Judge Tatel explained that the EPA was “[u]nswayed by
what it calls ‘narrow semantic analyses’”65 and:
claims that a “more holistic analysis . . . [of] the text, structure, and history of the CAA
as a whole, as well as the context provided by other legislation that is specific to climate
change,” justifies its conclusion that it cannot regulate [greenhouse gases] like [carbon
dioxide] for their effects on climate change.66
Judge Tatel responded to this argument by stating that for the EPA “[t]o
disregard the Act’s plain text in this way, EPA needs an ‘extraordinarily
convincing justification,’”67 because for the EPA “to avoid a literal
interpretation at Chevron step one, it must show either that, as a matter of
historical fact, Congress did not mean what it appears to have said, or that, as
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68. 415 F.3d at 68 (Tatel, J.  dissenting) (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1089
(D.C. Cir. 1996)).  The court in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n did not cite any Supreme Court decisions or
any other court decisions in support of this principle.  Prior to the statement of this principle, the court in
Engine Manufacturers Ass’n stated that “[t]he court’s role is not to ‘correct’ the text so that it better serves
the statute’s purposes, for it is the function of the political branches not only to define the goals but also
to choose the means for reaching them.”  88 F.3d at 1089 (citations omitted).
69. 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
70. Id. at 1041.
71. Id. (quoting Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
72. Id. (“[t]he court’s role is not to ‘correct’ the text so that it better serves the statute’s purposes)
(quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d 1075 at 1089); see supra note 68.
73. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
74. Id. at 242 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
75. 415 F.3d at 68 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
a matter of logic and statutory structure, it almost surely could not have meant
it.”68
Judge Tatel’s source for the “extraordinarily convincing justification”
standard is Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,69 a decision by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  In a passage that was followed
by a reference to Chevron step one,70 the court in Appalachian Power Co.
stated that “[r]eading a statute contrary to its seemingly clear meaning is
permissible ‘if the literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters,’”71 but that a court
“will not, however, invoke this rule to ratify an interpretation that abrogates
the enacted statutory text absent an extraordinarily convincing justification.”72
The “demonstrably at odds” phrase in this quotation is from the Supreme
Court’s 1989 decision in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,73 which
held, without citing or discussing Chevron, that “[t]he plain meaning of
legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the
intention of its drafters.’”74
Judge Tatel discussed four justifications that the EPA advocated for
“abandoning the [Clean Air] Act’s text,”75 but he found that “[n]one of these
reasons provides a convincing justification—let alone an ‘extraordinarily
convincing’ one—for EPA’s counter-textual position.”76  Consequently, he
concluded that these four justifications are insufficient grounds for
disregarding his initial conclusion under Chevron step one, and he therefore
found that “[greenhouse gases] plainly fall within the meaning of ‘air
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77. Id. at 73.
78. Id. at 68.
79. Id. (citing 111 CONG. REC. 25061 (Sept. 24, 1965) (statement of Rep. Helstoski); 116 CONG.
REC. 32914 (Sept. 21, 1970) (report introduced in the record by Sen. Boggs)).
80. 415 F.3d at 68.
81. Id.
82. Id. (the Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he fact that a statute can be applied in situations not
expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity.  It demonstrates breadth.”  (quoting
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 689 (2001)).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (2000); see supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
84. 415 F.3d at 69.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
pollutant’ in section 302(g) and therefore in section 202(a)(1) [of the Clean
Air Act].”77
The EPA’s first justification for not defining “air pollutants” under the
Clean Air Act to include greenhouse gases was that “since the 1965, 1970, and
1977 Congresses [that enacted amendments to the Clean Air Act] were not
specifically concerned with global warming, the Act cannot apply to
[greenhouse gases].”78  Although Judge Tatel conceded that the legislative
history of the 1965, 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Acts contain only “a few stray
references to human-forced climate change,”79 he noted that “in those years
the scientific understanding of the issue was nascent at best.”80  Judge Tatel
concluded that “EPA errs in suggesting that because Congress may not have
precisely foreseen global warming, the [Clean Air] Act provides no
authorization for [greenhouse gas] regulation,”81 pointing out that the
definition of “air pollutants” under section 302(g) “enables the Act to apply
to new air pollution problems as well as existing ones,”82 and that Congress
in 1970, in adding section 302(h)83 to the Clean Air Act, “expressly instructed
EPA to be on the lookout for climate-related problems in evaluating risks to
‘welfare.’”84
The EPA’s second justification for not applying section 202(a)(1) to
greenhouse gases was that “for practical and policy reasons global warming
should be dealt with through specifically tailored statutes . . . [because] a
statute aimed solely at global warming would deal with the problem more
effectively than one aimed generally at air pollution.”85  Judge Tatel rejected
this second reason on the grounds that the EPA “may not ‘avoid the
Congressional intent clearly expressed in the [statutory] text simply by
asserting that its preferred approach would be better policy.’”86  The EPA tried
to strengthen this second reason “by claiming that because the 1977 and 1990
Congresses enacted provisions [amending the Clean Air Act] specific to
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87. 415 F.3d at 69.
88. Clean Air Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 158, 91 Stat. 685, 730 (1977).
89. Id.
90. 415 F.3d at 69.  Judge Tatel also noted that a House Committee had stated in 1977 that it
believed that prior to the enactment in 1977 of Clean Air Act provisions aimed specifically at ozone
depletion, the EPA already had authority under an existing general provision of the Clean Air Act to
regulate emissions of pollutants to protect stratospheric ozone, H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 102 (1977), and
that Congress had enacted provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651 to 7651o, to deal specifically with certain regional
pollutants to control acid rain even though the EPA already had authority to regulate such pollutants under
general Clean Air Act provisions.  415 F.3d at 69.
91. 415 F.3d at 70.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2000).
93. Infra notes 288-96 and accompanying text.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 7408.
95. Id. at § 7409(b).  Part IV of this article, infra notes 288-98 and accompanying text, discusses
regulations that a state might include in a state implementation plan adopted under section 110 of the Clean
Air Act, to control emissions of carbon dioxide from in-use on-road vehicles, if carbon dioxide was listed
as a criteria pollutant under section 108 of the Act and the EPA established national ambient air quality
standards for carbon dioxide under section 109 of the Act.
another global pollution problem—depletion of stratospheric ozone—we must
infer that the Act’s general provisions do not cover such global problems.”87
Judge Tatel noted that Congress in 1977 enacted legislation88 that made clear
that “nothing in this [ozone-specific] part shall be construed to alter or affect
the authority of the [EPA] Administrator . . . under any other provision of this
Act,”89 and found “nothing in the 1990 Congress’s enactment of other
provisions specific to stratospheric ozone, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671 to 7671q,
indicating it thought the EPA lacked authority under general provisions like
section 202 to regulate emissions contributing to global pollution.”90
Judge Tatel rejected the EPA’s unworkability argument in support of its
second justification, because the “EPA acknowledges . . . [that] regulating
[carbon dioxide] emissions from automobiles is perfectly feasible” and
practical through improved fuel economy.91  This argument was premised
upon a contention that state regulation of carbon dioxide emissions, under
state implementation plans adopted under section 11092 of the Clean Air Act,
would be “unworkable.”  As discussed in Part IV of this Article,93 states
would be required to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide under section 110
state implementation plans if carbon dioxide was listed as a criteria pollutant
under section 10894 of the Clean Air Act and the EPA established national
ambient air quality standards for carbon dioxide under section 109(b).95  The
EPA asserted that states would be unable to achieve national ambient air
quality standards for carbon dioxide under state implementation plans because
carbon dioxide “disperses relatively evenly throughout the lower atmosphere,
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96. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 70 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
100. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 68 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 70.  In this part of his opinion, Judge Tatel did not explicitly discuss, as did the EPA
Administrator in his decision, section 602(e) of the Clean Air Act, which directs the EPA to determine the
global warming potential of substances that deplete stratospheric ozone.  The EPA Administrator stressed
in his decision that this provision did not authorize the imposition of mandatory requirements and expressly
precludes its use for regulatory purposes.  Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines,
68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,926 (Sept. 8, 2003).  The EPA Administrator failed to note, however, that section
602(g), which specifically states that “[t]he preceding sentence [directing the Administrator to publish the
global warming potential of listed substances] shall not be construed to be the basis of any additional
regulation under [the Clean Air Act],” does not prohibit the EPA Administrator from regulating emissions
of greenhouse gases under other sections of the Clean Air Act.
[so] states would have only minimal control over their atmospheric [carbon
dioxide] concentrations and thus over whether they meet the [carbon dioxide
national ambient air quality standards].”96  This unworkability argument was
premised upon a contention that because regulation of carbon dioxide
emissions would be unworkable under section 110 state implementation plans,
the EPA is not authorized to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under section
202(a)(1) or any of the other general provisions of the Clean Air Act.97  Judge
Tatel concluded, however, that the unworkability of section 110 state
implementation plans “would justify at most an exception limited to the
particular unworkable provision” under the “absurd-results canon.”98
As its third justification for not considering greenhouse gases to be “air
pollutants” subject to regulation under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act,
the EPA relied upon FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,99 which the
EPA argued supported the proposition “that Congress’s passage of legislation
calling for study of climate change, along with Congress’s failure to pass any
provisions [for the Clean Air Act] tailored solely to regulating [greenhouse
gases], demonstrates that the [Clean Air Act] cannot apply to [greenhouse
gases].”100  The EPA’s argument in support of this third reason relied upon the
following specific congressional action and inaction:
(1) . . . all direct references to [carbon dioxide] or global warming in the 1990 [Clean Air
Act] amendments appear in nonregulatory provisions; (2) . . . other congressional acts
such as the 1978 National Climate Program Act, the 1987 Global Climate Protection Act,
the 1990 Global Change Research Act, and the 1992 Energy Policy Act, as well as
several appropriations riders, touch specifically on the issue of global warming, typically
by instructing agencies to study the issue; and (3) . . . Congress has considered and
rejected many bills specifically tailored to [greenhouse gases] emissions regulation since
at least 1990.101
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102. 415 F.3d at 70.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 71 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 144 (2000)).
106. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 71.
Although Judge Tatel noted that “[o]ne might well wonder what all this
has to do with whether [greenhouse gases] are ‘air pollutants’ within the
meaning of [Clean Air Act] section 302(g),”102 he noted that the EPA relied
“almost exclusively” on Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. in claiming “that
together these facts indicate that the [Clean Air Act’s] general provisions do
not cover [greenhouse gases] . . . and that, as in Brown & Williamson, the
‘extraordinary’ political and economic significance of the regulation requested
casts doubts on the agency’s authority to undertake it.”103
In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme Court decided the
issue of whether the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has authority,
under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), to regulate tobacco
products.  The Supreme Court held in that case that the FDA did not have such
authority, even though the “broad language” of the FDCA “suggested that it
did,”104 because federal statutes enacted subsequent to the FDCA (which
mandated specified warnings on tobacco products and regulated the
advertising of tobacco products) embody a specific policy of permitting
tobacco products to remain on sale.  The Supreme Court noted that if the FDA
was held to have authority to regulate tobacco products under the FDCA, the
FDA would have to ban tobacco products from sale entirely due to their health
risks despite the fact that subsequently enacted federal legislation indicated
that Congress intended tobacco products to remain for sale on the market.
Judge Tatel also noted that the Supreme Court in Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. emphasized numerous times that the FDA repeatedly had
claimed to have no authority to regulate tobacco products, and that the
Supreme Court stated that “Congress’s tobacco-specific statutes had
effectively ratified the FDA’s long-held position.”105
Judge Tatel found that “EPA’s reliance on Brown & Williamson is
misplaced”106 for a number of reasons.  First, he noted that the EPA’s
jurisdiction over greenhouse gas emissions under section 202(a)(1) “would
[not] be as significant as FDA jurisdiction over tobacco” because the EPA
“already extensively regulates the energy and transportation industries” under
the Clean Air Act,
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107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 144).
109. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 42-43 (1977)).
110. 415 F.3d at 71.
111. Id.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 7403(g); 42 U.S.C. § 7671a(e); Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 821,
104 Stat. 2399, 2699 (1990).
113. National Climate Program Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-367, 92 Stat. 601 (1978); Global Climate
Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1101-06, 101 Stat. 1331, 1407-09 (1987); Global Change
Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-606, 104 Stat. 3096 (1990); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
whereas the FDA had no prior authority over the tobacco industry.  Moreover, EPA
jurisdiction would lead only to regulation of [greenhouse gases]—with, in the case of
section 202, regulation taking effect only after “such period as the Administrator finds
necessary” for development of technology, “giving appropriate consideration to the cost
of compliance.”  42 U.S.C.  § 7521(a)(2).  By contrast, FDA jurisdiction over tobacco
would have triggered a total product ban.107
Judge Tatel also concluded that, unlike Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
the present case involving regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under
section 202 of the Clean Air Act “is not an ‘extraordinary case’ where
‘common sense’ . . . calls into question whether Congress has delegated EPA
authority to regulate [greenhouse gases].”108  He stressed that “Congress gave
EPA broad authority to regulate all harmful pollutants, as section 202(a)(1)’s
text makes clear . . . [and] did so intentionally, deeming it ‘not appropriate to
exempt certain pollutants’ from the Act’s ‘comprehensive protections.’”109
Judge Tatel also concluded that “no subsequent statutory indicia
comparable to those relied on by the Court in Brown & Williamson justify a
different conclusion [and] [p]erhaps most significantly, no conflict exists
between EPA’s section 202(a)(1) authority to regulate [greenhouse gases] and
subsequent global warming legislation.”110  He explained that EPA regulation
of greenhouse gases “would be fully compatible with statutes proposing
additional research and other nonregulatory approaches to climate change,”
“[w]hereas an FDA ban on tobacco would have directly conflicted with
congressional intent that tobacco remain on the market.”111  Specifically, he
found that three provisions112 of the Clean Air Act enacted in 1990 which refer
either to carbon dioxide or to global warming do not explicitly provide nor
suggest that the EPA lacks authority to regulate carbon dioxide under other
parts of the Act and that “[o]ther climate related acts[]113 similarly
demonstrating congressional intent that global climate issues receive study
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114. 415 F.3d at 71.
115. Judge Tatel noted that the EPA took the position that it had authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act at the time of enactment of two appropriation riders,
Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461, 2496 (1998) (barring use of funds for
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming).  415 F.3d at 72.
116. 415 F.3d at 72 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156
(2000)).
117. 415 F.3d at 72.  He stressed that “[n]ot only is ‘subsequent legislative history . . . a hazardous
basis for inferring the intent of an earlier Congress,’ but it ‘is a particularly dangerous ground . . . when it
concerns, as it does here . . . proposals that do not become law.’”  Id. (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)) (citation omitted).  He added:  “[I]ndeed, in interpreting the scope
of the FDA’s authority, the Brown & Williamson Court itself expressly declined to rely on failed
legislation.”  415 F.3d at 72 (citing 529 U.S. at 155).
118. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 502, 89 Stat. 871, 902-07 (1975).
119. 415 F.3d at 68 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
120. This DOT authority under the EPCA is discussed infra notes 253-57 and accompanying text.
and attention are likewise perfectly compatible with [greenhouse gases]
regulation.”114
Judge Tatel also noted that the EPA had not claimed that it lacked
authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions at the
time that these subsequent global warming related statutes were enacted,115
whereas in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.  “subsequent tobacco
legislation ‘effectively ratified the FDA’s previous position’”116 that it did not
have authority to regulate tobacco products.  In his reasoning in support of this
final point for rejecting the EPA’s third justification, Judge Tatel discounted
the failure of later Congresses to enact “bills specifically tailored to regulating
global warming” on the grounds that such inaction “hardly provides a basis for
inferring that earlier Congresses meant to exclude climate-endangering
pollutants from the coverage of the [Clean Air Act’s] general provisions.”117
The EPA’s fourth justification for not considering carbon dioxide to be
an “air pollutant” under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act was that
Congress could not have had such an intent “since EPA regulation [under
section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act] of [carbon dioxide] emissions from
automobiles would overlap with Department of Transportation (DOT)
authority over fuel economy standards under [the 1975 Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA)118].”119  The DOT has authority under EPCA to
establish average fuel economy standards for certain classes of motor
vehicles.120  This EPA argument is premised upon the EPA’s contention that
“the only practical way to regulate [carbon dioxide] emissions from motor
vehicles is to require increased fuel economy, since [carbon dioxide] is a
byproduct of fuel combustion and ‘no technology currently exists or is under
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121. 415 F.3d at 72 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles
and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,929 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
122. 415 F.3d at 72.
123. Id.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2) (2000).
125. 415 F.3d at 72.
126. Id. (quoting FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
127. 415 F.3d at 73.  Judge Tatel continued by pointing out that the EPCA:
current[ly] . . . recognize[s] the relevance of “the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the
Government on fuel economy,” 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f); see also EPCA, Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 502(e),
89 Stat. at 905, but in passing the 1977 [Clean Air Act] amendments Congress emphasized that
EPA regulation under the [Clean Air Act] should go forward even when it overlaps with
responsibilities given to other agencies under other acts, see H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 42-43
(explaining that Congress was amending section 302(g) to broaden the meaning of “air pollutants”
and make clear that EPA has authority even over pollutants already regulated by another agency).
415 F.3d at 73.
development that can capture and destroy or reduce [carbon dioxide]
emissions from motor vehicle tailpipes.’”121
Judge Tatel rejected this fourth argument by the EPA on the grounds that
“the two regulatory regimes—one [(EPCA)] targeted at fuel conservation and
the other [(Clean Air Act)] at pollution prevention—are overlapping, not
incompatible.”122  He suggested123 that if the EPA’s only practical option at the
present time for regulating carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles is
setting standards for fuel economy, rather than standards for capturing tailpipe
carbon dioxide emissions, then under section 202(a)(2)124 of the Clean Air
Act, such section 202(a)(1) fuel economy standards shall take effect only
“after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the
development and application of the requisite technology.”  However, although
the EPA argued that EPA fuel economy standards established under section
202(a)(1) either would abrogate DOT fuel economy standards under the
EPCA (if EPA standards were more stringent than DOT standards) or would
be meaningless (if EPA standards were less stringent than DOT standards),
Judge Tatel still concluded that the two statutes were overlapping and that
therefore “there is no reason to assume that Congress exempted [carbon
dioxide] from the meaning of ‘air pollutant’ within the [Clean Air Act].”125
Judge Tatel concluded the part of his opinion rejecting the EPA’s fourth
justification by stating that “[w]here two ‘statutes are capable of co-existence,
it becomes the duty of this court’ to regard each as effective—at least absent
clear congressional intent to the contrary;”126 and that in both the EPCA and
the Clean Air Act “Congress acknowledged, and indeed accepted, the
possibility of regulatory overlap.”127
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128. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 42-43 (1977)).
129. 415 F.3d at 73.
130. Id. at 56 (Randolph, J.).
131. Id. at 58.
132. Id. at 59 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment).
133. Id. at 62 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
135. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C.  Cir.  1976) (en banc).
Judge Tatel then noted that the 1977 House Report on the 1977 Clean Air
Act amendments “explained . . . [that] ‘the Clean Air Act is the
comprehensive vehicle for protection of the Nation’s health from air pollution.
In the committee’s view, it is not appropriate to exempt certain pollutants or
certain sources from the comprehensive protections afforded by the Clean Air
Act’”128 and concluded that “[greenhouse gases] plainly fall within the
meaning of ‘air pollutant’ in section 302(g) and therefore in section 202(a)(1)
[of the Clean Air Act].”129
Judge Randolph “assume[d] arguendo that EPA has statutory authority
[under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act] to regulate greenhouse gases
[emissions] from new motor vehicles,”130 but held that “the EPA
Administrator properly exercised his discretion under [section] 202(a)(1) in
denying the petition for rulemaking [that would regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles].”131
Judge Sentelle, although dissenting in part to the majority’s holding that
petitioners had standing to sue,132 joined Judge Randolph’s decision to deny
the four petitions challenging the EPA’s final action in refusing to grant the
petition for rulemaking.  Judge Sentelle issued no opinion in support of his
decision to concur in this judgment.
Judge Tatel, in dissent, argued that none of the policy reasons set forth by
the EPA in support of its decision to deny the petition for rulemaking, relate
to the statutory standard under section 202(a)(1),133 that requires the EPA
Administrator to prescribe a standard under that section applicable to the
emission of an air pollutant from new motor vehicles “which in his judgment
cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.”134
Judge Randolph, however, concluded that the EPA Administrator
properly exercised his discretion under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act
in deciding not to set standards for carbon dioxide emissions for new motor
vehicles.  Relying upon Ethyl Corp. v. EPA135 he stated that the EPA
Administrator has considerable discretion under section 202(a)(1) in making
a threshold judgment about whether to regulate and that the EPA
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136. 415 F.3d at 58 (quoting Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 20, 26).  As discussed infra notes 168-77 and
accompanying text, Judge Tatel in his dissenting opinion argued that Ethyl Corp. limits the EPA’s exercise
of policy judgment under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act to a determination of endangerment to
public health based on an assessment of risks, in relationship to other provisions of the Clean Air Act; and
that the EPA “Administrator is [not] free to set policy on his own terms.”  415 F.3d at 76 (quoting Ethyl
Corp., 541 F.2d at 29).
137. 415 F.3d at 58.  Judge Randolph explained that the EPA Administrator had based this finding
of scientific uncertainty upon a report issued in 2001 by the National Research Council entitled Climate
Change Science:  An Analysis of Some of the Key Questions, which caused the EPA Administrator to
conclude that it should forego rulemaking under section 202(a)(1) “until more is understood about the
causes, extent and significance of climate change and the potential options for addressing it.”  Control of
Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003).
138. 415 F.3d at 58 (citing Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 52,929).
139. Id. (quoting Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,931).
140. Id. (citing Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,931).
141. Judge Randolph referred to the EPA’s reference to efforts to develop fuel cell and hybrid
Administrator can exercise this discretion on the basis both of his assessment
of scientific evidence and policy judgments:  “the sort of policy judgments
Congress makes when it decides whether to enact legislation regulating a
particular area.”136  Judge Randolph found that the EPA’s grounds for denying
the petition for rulemaking under section 202(a)(1) “is entirely consistent”
with the Ethyl Corp.  decision,” because EPA denied the petition for
rulemaking on the basis of both “scientific uncertainty about the causal effects
of greenhouse gases on the future climate of the earth”137 and “many ‘policy’
considerations that, in his judgment, warranted regulatory forbearance at this
time.”138
One of these policy considerations noted by Judge Randolph was that new
motor vehicles are only one of many sources of greenhouse gas emissions and
that promulgation of standards under section 202(a)(1) to control greenhouse
gas emissions from new motor vehicles would “result in an inefficient,
piecemeal approach to the climate change issue.”139  Another policy reason he
noted was “that unilateral regulation of U.S. motor vehicle emissions could
weaken efforts to persuade developing countries to reduce the intensity of
greenhouse gases thrown off by their economies.”140  Judge Randolph also
explained that “[o]ngoing research into scientific uncertainties and the
Administration’s programs to address climate change including voluntary
emission reduction programs and initiatives with private entities to develop
new technology also played a role in the Administrator’s decision not to
regulate.”141  Judge Randolph noted that the EPA Administrator had rejected
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vehicles and hydrogen as a primary fuel for automobiles and trucks.  Id. (citing Control of Emissions from
New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,931).
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143. 415 F.3d at 58.
144. Id. (citation omitted).
145. Id. (quoting Ethyl Corp. v EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)).
146. Id. (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
147. 415 F.3d at 58.
148. Id. at 62.
the two alternative ways offered by the petitioners to control carbon dioxide
emissions from new motor vehicles—reduced gasoline consumption and
improved tire performance—on the grounds that the DOT has established fuel
efficiency standards that have prevented emissions of millions of metric tons
of carbon dioxide and that the EPA probably does not have authority under
section 202 of the Clean Air Act to regulate tire efficiency as an “emission”
of an air pollutant.142  Finally, Judge Randolph noted that the EPA
Administrator had indicated that the petitioners had not presented the EPA
with any suggestions as to how emissions of the other greenhouse gases
(methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons) from motor vehicles might
be reduced.143
Judge Randolph then stated that petitioners had not accurately
characterized the EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles as a decision that “rested entirely on scientific uncertainty,
or that EPA’s decision represented an ‘open-ended invocation of scientific
uncertainty to justify refusing to regulate.’”144  Stating that “[a] determination
of endangerment to public health is necessarily a question of policy that is to
be based on an assessment of risks and that should not be bound by either the
procedural or the substantive rigor proper for questions of fact,”145 and that “a
reviewing court ‘will uphold agency conclusions based on policy judgments’
when an agency must resolve issues on the ‘frontiers of scientific
knowledge,’”146 Judge Randolph held that the EPA Administrator properly
exercised his discretion under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act in
denying the petition seeking to have the EPA set standards for greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles.147
Judge Tatel, in dissent, argued that “none of these policy” reasons relied
upon by the EPA Administrator to deny the petition for rulemaking “relates
to the statutory standard [in section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act]—cause,
or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare,” and asserted that “the Clean Air Act gives
the Administrator no discretion to withhold regulation for such reasons.”148
2006] MOTOR VEHICLE GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION 25
149. Id. at 80 (citing Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 29-31).
150. Id. at 73.  Although Judge Tatel did not do so, Judge Randolph had noted that the court had
jurisdiction under section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act to review the EPA Administrator’s denial of the
petition for rulemaking at issue in the case.  Id. at 53-54.  Judge Tatel did note that actions of the EPA
Administrator under the Clean Air Act that are subject to judicial review are reviewed under the arbitrary
and capricious standard under section 307(b)(9) which authorizes a court to reverse any action of the EPA
Administrator to which section 307(b) applies that the court finds is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  Id. at 73.
151. 415 F.3d at 73 (quoting Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lynn, 812 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
152. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  Identical language is used in section 307(d)(9)(A) of the Clean Air Act,
the provision governing judicial review in the case reviewing the EPA Administrator’s decision not to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions from new motor vehicles under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.
153. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).  “Although this inquiry
into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.  The court is
not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”  Id.
154. 415 F.3d at 73.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 73-74.
He added later in his opinion that greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles can be regulated by the EPA under section 202(a)(1) even though
motor vehicles are not the only source of greenhouse gas emissions.149
Judge Tatel noted that the EPA Administrator’s denial of the petition for
rulemaking under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act was subject to
judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard,150 which requires
a reviewing court to determine if “the agency’s decision making was reasoned,
. . . [and whether] the agency . . . [made] plain errors of law.”151  Although not
mentioned by Judge Tatel, the Supreme Court has stated that in order for a
reviewing court to determine that an agency’s decision was not “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”
under section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act,152 “the court
must consider whether the decision was based on the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”153
Judge Tatel argued that he believed that the EPA Administrator had failed
to satisfy this arbitrary and capricious standard,154 adding that he found “it
difficult even to grasp the basis for EPA’s action.”155  Judge Tatel found that
the EPA Administrator, both in his commentary accompanying his denial of
the petition for rulemaking and in his brief submitted to the court, argued that
he has discretion under section 202(a)(1) either not to make any finding,
affirmative or negative, as to whether carbon dioxide emissions endanger
public health or welfare, or not to set emission standards under section
202(a)(1) even if he makes an affirmative endangerment finding.156  Judge
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158. Id. at 74 (quoting Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,929-33 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
159. 415 F.3d at 81.
160. Id. at 74.
Tatel also found that the EPA Administrator had relied upon a number of
policy concerns in deciding that regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under
section 202(a)(1) “is a bad idea” and that therefore he should exercise his
discretion to withhold making an endangerment finding under section
202(a)(1).  Such a finding would involve him making a judgment as to
whether greenhouse gas emissions “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”157
Judge Tatel stated that these policy concerns included that:
(1) “there continue to be important uncertainties in our understanding of the factors that
may affect future climate change and how it should be addressed”; (2) petitioners
identified no technologies for reducing [methane, nitrous oxides and hydrofluorocarbons]
emissions, and technologies for reducing [carbon dioxide] emissions either overlap with
DOT’s authority or require further development; (3) regulation “would also result in an
inefficient, piecemeal approach to addressing the climate change issue,” as the “U.S.
motor vehicle fleet is one of many sources of [greenhouse gases] emissions both here and
abroad”; (4) “unilateral EPA regulation of motor vehicle [greenhouse gases] emissions
could also weaken U.S. efforts to persuade key developing countries to reduce the
[greenhouse gases] intensity of their economies”; and (5) “EPA disagrees with the
regulatory approach urged by petitioners,” instead preferring “a number of nonregulatory
approaches to reducing [greenhouse gases] emissions” in line with “the President’s
global climate change policy” of “supporting vital global climate research and laying the
groundwork for future action by investing in science, technology, and institutions.”158
Later in his dissent,159 Judge Tatel stated that the EPA Administrator had
not explicitly explained how any of these scientific uncertainties and policy
considerations relate or link to the statutory standard under section 202(a)(1)
which requires him to determine if an air pollutant emitted from new motor
vehicles or their engines causes or contributes to air pollution which
reasonably may be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.  Judge
Tatel argued that Congress has given the EPA Administrator only “limited
discretion” under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act “to determine
whether or not an air pollutant causes or contributes to pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” not
“discretion to withhold regulation because [he] thinks such regulation bad
policy.”160  Judge Tatel asserted that section 202(a)(1) gives the EPA
Administrator “the discretion only to judge, within the bounds of substantial
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163. Id.
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165. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B)(1982).  This provision was amended by the 1990 Clean Air Act
amendments.  Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat. 2399, 2531 (1990).
evidence,” whether particular pollutants “cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”161
Judge Tatel noted that the EPA Administrator may withhold such an
endangerment judgment for emissions of a particular pollutant under section
202(a)(1) in several different situations:  when there is conflicting credible
evidence (with “some evidence indicating that [the pollutant] may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger welfare and other evidence suggesting the
opposite”), when “the facts are known but require no single conclusion as to
whether a pollutant ‘may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare’—such as in a case where there exists a small-to-moderate risk that
a pollutant will cause a small-to-moderate amount of harm,” and when “the
Administrator concludes based on substantial evidence that more research is
needed before he can judge whether [a particular pollutant] may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger welfare.”162
But Judge Tatel stated that “section 202(a)(1) plainly limits the
Administrator’s discretion—his judgment—to determining whether the
statutory standard for endangerment has been met.  The Administrator has no
discretion either to base that judgment on reasons unrelated to this standard
or to withhold judgment for such reasons.”163
Judge Tatel found that the EPA’s claim to the contrary not only ignored
the plain language of section 202(a)(1), but also was contrary to a number of
previous decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia interpreting other provisions of the Clean Air Act that require the
EPA Administrator to make an endangerment finding in setting certain
emission or regulatory standards for air pollutants.  He first discussed Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,164 which held that the EPA
Administrator could not consider costs of compliance or technological
feasibility in setting emission standards for hazardous air pollutants under a
then-existing provision165 of the Clean Air Act that required the standards to
be set “at the level which in his judgment provides an ample margin of safety
to protect the public health.”  The court in that case held that under that
provision the EPA Administrator had to establish an emission standard for
hazardous air pollutants at a level that he determined provided “an ample
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166. 824 F.2d at 1164-65.
167. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 75 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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169. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 57-58.  Judge Randolph’s interpretation of Ethyl Corp. is
discussed supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(1)(A) (1976), currently codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A)
(2000).
171. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
172. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 58.
margin of safety” to protect public health, without regard to the cost of
complying with the standard and without regard to whether it was
technologically feasible to comply with the standard.166  Judge Tatel asserted
that the decision “makes clear that the Administrator may only exercise
‘judgment’ in evaluating whether the statutory standard has been met.”167
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,168 upon which Judge Randolph relied169 to uphold the
EPA Administrator’s denial of the petition for rulemaking under section
202(a)(1), was also relied upon by Judge Tatel in support of his belief that the
EPA Administrator had not complied with his statutory duties under section
202(a)(1).  The court in Ethyl Corp. upheld the EPA’s decision to adopt
regulations under section 211(c)(1)(A)170 of the Clean Air Act to reduce the
permissible amount of lead additives in gasoline.  Section 211(c)(1)(A)
provided at the time that the EPA Administrator “may” regulate fuel additives
“if any emission products of such . . . fuel additives will endanger the public
health or welfare.”  After determining that lead in gasoline presented a
“significant risk of harm to the public health,” the EPA issued regulations
under section 211(c)(1)(A) that required the amount of lead additives in
gasoline to be reduced significantly.  The regulated industry challenged the
regulations on the ground that the EPA Administrator had to prove actual
harm to public health from lead in gasoline, rather than a significant risk of
harm.171  The court in Ethyl Corp. held that the EPA Administrator had acted
properly under section 211(c)(1)(A) to regulate after a finding of a significant
risk of harm to public health.  Judge Randolph had interpreted the Ethyl Corp.
decision as “not requir[ing] the Administrator to exercise his discretion solely
on the basis of his assessment of scientific evidence” and that the EPA
Administrator also can “take[] into account . . . the sort of policy judgments
Congress makes when it decided whether to enact legislation regulating a
particular area.”172  Judge Tatel, however, stated that the court in Ethyl Corp.:
held that the agency had discretion in determining what level of harm—or risk of
harm—constitutes endangerment . . . [and] that such determinations involve policy
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176. Id. at 76.
177. 415 F.3d at 76 (quoting Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 29).  Judge Tatel then observed that in Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. the Supreme Court had noted that the FDA’s “judgment” about how best to
achieve public health goals is “no substitute for the specific safety determinations required by the FDCA’s
various operative provisions.”  Id.
178. 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
179. 415 F.3d at 76.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (1982).
issues, but—as Judge Randolph neglects to mention, . . .—those policy issues all related
to whether the statutory standard had been met, i.e., to whether lead in gasoline
endangered public health.”173
In support of this interpretation of Ethyl Corp., Judge Tatel quoted the
following two statements in Ethyl Corp.:  “a determination of endangerment
to public health is necessarily a question of policy that is to be based on an
assessment of risks and that should not be bound by either the procedural or
the substantive rigor proper for questions of fact,”174 and “the statute accords
the regulator flexibility to assess risks and make essentially legislative policy
judgments.”175  He added that “[I]ndeed, Ethyl makes quite clear that the
Administrator’s policy-based discretion is limited to the terms of the
statute,”176 and then quoted the following passage from Ethyl Corp.:
All this is not to say that Congress left the Administrator free to set policy on his own
terms.  To the contrary, the policy guidelines are largely set, both in the statutory term
“will endanger” and in the relationship of that term to other sections of the Clean Air Act.
These prescriptions direct the Administrator’s actions.177
These statements from Ethyl Corp. quoted by Judge Tatel clearly support his
interpretation of the Ethyl Corp. decision rather than Judge Randolph’s
interpretation.
Judge Tatel also relied upon Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario
v. EPA,178 for the principle that “for EPA to decline to make an endangerment
finding, it must have a statutorily based reason for doing so.”179  In that case,
the EPA Administrator had declined to make an endangerment finding with
respect to acid rain under section 115(a)180 of the Clean Air Act, which
provided that when the Administrator had “reason to believe that any air
pollutant . . . may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare in a foreign country . . . the Administrator shall give formal notice
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thereof to the Governor of the state in which such omissions originate.”  Judge
Tatel stated that the court in that case:
held that EPA acted reasonably in postponing a formal endangerment finding only
because it gave a reasonable statutory basis for doing so[,] . . . [that] EPA still lacked
information as to which states were causing the harmful acid rain, [and therefore] it
would have been “pointless” for the agency to make an endangerment finding given the
“specific [statutory] linkage between the endangerment finding and the remedial
procedures,” i.e., notifying offending states.181
Judge Tatel therefore concluded that:
[The] EPA may withhold an endangerment finding only if it needs more information to
determine whether the statutory standard has been met [and] [s]imilarly, for EPA to find
no endangerment (as Judge Randolph, going beyond the agency’s own arguments,
appears to claim happened here . . .), it must ground that conclusion in the statutory
standard and may not rely upon unrelated policy considerations.182
Judge Tatel also observed that section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act is
“precautionary,”183 allowing the EPA Administrator to set standards for the
emissions of an air pollutant which reasonably may be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare, without the need for actual harm or endangerment to
public health or welfare to be occurring.  He noted that at the time Ethyl Corp.
was decided, section 202(a)(1) and some other sections of the Clean Air Act
required or authorized the EPA Administrator to take specified action upon a
finding that emissions caused “air pollution which endangers the public health
or welfare.”184  He noted, however, that after Ethyl Corp. held that the EPA
Administrator was permitted by such statutory language to take “regulatory
action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than certain that harm is
otherwise inevitable,”185 Congress in 1977 amended the Clean Air Act to
follow this precautionary or preventative standard in the present version of
section 202(a)(1) and other sections of the Clean Air Act.186
Judge Tatel concluded that the EPA Administrator had relied upon
impermissible policy considerations in denying the petition for rulemaking
under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act:
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Given this framework, it is obvious that none of EPA’s proffered policy reasons justifies
its refusal to find that [greenhouse gases] emissions “contribute to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”  Unlike in Her
Majesty the Queen, EPA’s proffered reasons for refusing to make an endangerment
finding have no connection to the statutory standard.  Instead, as in Natural Resources
Defense Council (where we found EPA to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously), EPA
has “ventured into a zone of impermissible action” by “simply substituting” freestanding
policy concerns for the sort of evaluation required by the statute . . . .187
Judge Tatel then found that “EPA[‘s] claims that global warming still has
many scientific uncertainties associated with it” seemed to be calling for proof
or unequivocal evidence, “whereas section 202(a)(1) only . . . calls for the
Administrator to determine whether [greenhouse gases] ‘contribute to air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger’ welfare.”188  He
noted that:
[The] EPA never suggests that the uncertainties identified by the [National Research
Council] report prevent it from determining that [greenhouse gases] “may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger” welfare.  In other words, just as EPA failed in Natural
Resources Defense Council to explain its chosen emissions level in light of the statutory
standard, so the agency has failed here to explain its refusal to find endangerment in light
of the statutory standard.189
Judge Tatel then stated that, taking into account the National Research
Council report as a whole, he:
doubt[ed] that EPA could credibly conclude that it needs more research to determine
whether [greenhouse gases]-caused global warming “may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger” welfare.  Though not offering certainty, the report demonstrates that matters
are well within the “frontiers of scientific knowledge” . . . . The report also indicates that
the projected consequences of global warming are serious.190
Because Judge Tatel’s decision clearly establishes that the EPA
Administrator, in denying the petition for rulemaking under section 202(a)(1)
of the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles, relied upon policy considerations that are not statutorily permissible
relevant factors under section 202(a)(1), the court should have found that the
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Administrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of
section 307(b)(9)191 of the Clean Air Act.
However, as noted by Judge Tatel, the EPA Administrator never clearly
has made an endangerment finding under section 202(a)(1) on the basis of
scientific risk assessment considerations, and the court therefore should have
remanded the case to the EPA Administrator with an order for him to make a
decision on the petition for rulemaking on the explicit basis of whether
scientific risk assessment indicates that greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles or their engines “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”  As
noted by Judge Tatel at the end of his dissenting opinion,192 the EPA
Administrator would violate section 202(a)(1) by “[r]efusing to regulate
following an endangerment finding.”
The EPA Administrator should change his previous position and should
now make an endangerment finding with respect to carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, and then
should adopt an appropriate standard under section 202(a)(1) to control
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases from new motor
vehicles.  To fulfill this responsibility, the EPA could adopt a standard under
section 202(a)(1) that is identical to, or based upon, California’s recently-
adopted regulations that set limits on the amounts of greenhouse gases that can
be emitted from new motor vehicles beginning with the 2009 model year.193
Alternatively, the EPA could adopt a greenhouse gas emissions reduction
standard under section 202(a)(1) that specifies a minimum miles per gallon
standard for new motor vehicles.  At present, the EPA contends that the only
method for controlling the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by a motor
vehicle is by fuel economy.194  Therefore, the EPA Administrator might adopt
a fuel economy standard under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act to
control carbon dioxide emissions from new motor vehicles and new motor
vehicle engines which can be achieved with existing technology and at a
reasonable cost.  Of course, if the EPA sets a fuel economy standard for a
particular class of new motor vehicles under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean
Air Act that is not as strict as the DOT fuel economy standard for that class,
the EPA fuel economy standard will not have a significant impact either upon
global warming or upon motor vehicle manufacturers.
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However, if the EPA sets a fuel economy standard under section
202(a)(1) for one or more particular classes of new motor vehicles under
section 202(a)(1) that is stricter than the applicable DOT CAFE standard, the
EPA standard may result in a significant reduction in the emissions of carbon
dioxide in the United States.  Because the DOT’s 27.5 miles per gallon of
gasoline CAFE fuel economy standard for passenger automobiles under the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act has not been revised since 1986, a miles
per gallon fuel economy standard for passenger automobiles of more than 27.5
miles per gallon may well be technologically achievable at a reasonable cost
today, albeit through production of more high mileage small passenger
automobiles and production of less low gas mileage large SUVs and pickup
trucks.  But with the price of gasoline at times approaching three dollars per
gallon in many areas of the United States, many American consumers may
support an EPA fuel economy standard that is stricter than the present CAFE
standards under the EPCA.
Such a stricter fuel economy standard for passenger automobiles, sports
utility vehicles and light duty pickup trucks may result in the production and
sale in the United States of more fuel efficient smaller passenger automobiles
and less production and sale of large, “gas guzzling” sports utility vehicles and
pickup trucks, a change that motor vehicle manufacturers may make
voluntarily in the near future as American consumers increasingly purchase
more high gas mileage smaller passenger automobiles and fewer low gas
mileage SUVs and pickup trucks.195
Reductions in carbon dioxide emissions from new motor vehicles in the
United States may not significantly reduce global warming and climate
changes if there are increased emissions of greenhouse gases in the future in
other countries, particularly in Third World developing nations.  However,
reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases in the United States would result
in the United States fulfilling, at least in part, its obligations under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,196 which the United
States has signed and ratified, to “limit[] its anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases,”197 “with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their
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1990 levels these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol.”198
Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions within the United States also may
strengthen, not weaken, the United States’s attempts to influence Third World
developing countries to begin to control their greenhouse gas emissions,
because developing countries probably will be more likely to agree to requests
by the United States to start controlling their greenhouse gas emissions if the
United States has begun to control at least one significant source of its
greenhouse gas emissions.
III.  STATE REGULATION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM NEW
MOTOR VEHICLES
The California Air Resources Board has adopted regulations199 that limit
the amount of emissions of greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles sold
in the state beginning with the 2009 model year.  This was done in response
to legislation200 enacted by the California General Assembly that directed the
Board to “adopt regulations that achieve the maximum feasible and cost-
effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles”201
“manufactured in the 2009 model year, or any model year thereafter.”202
However, these state regulations probably are preempted by both section
209(a)203 of the Clean Air Act and by the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act204 unless the EPA Administrator grants a waiver for the regulations under
section 209(b)205 of the Clean Air Act.
The California legislation, referred to as the “California Climate Law,”
requires the state’s greenhouse gas emission reduction regulations for new
motor vehicles to be “[c]apable of being successfully accomplished within the
time provided . . . taking into account environmental, economic, social, and
technological factors [and to be] [e]conomical to an owner or operator of a
vehicle, taking into account the full-life cycle costs of a vehicle.”206  In
developing these regulations, the state board was required to “[c]onsider the
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207. Id.  at § 43,018(c).  The Board’s consideration of the economic impact of the regulations was
required to include consideration of the creation of jobs and new businesses within the state, the expansion
or elimination of existing businesses within the state, the ability of businesses within the state to compete
with businesses in other states, “[t]he ability of the state to maintain and attract businesses in communities
with the most significant exposure to air contaminants, localized air contaminants, or both, including, but
not limited to, communities with minority populations or low-income populations, or both,” and automobile
workers and affiliated businesses within the state.  Id. at § 43,018(c)(2).
208. Id. at § 43,018(c)(3).  To the extent permitted by state and federal law, the board is required to
grant emission reductions credits for any reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles that
are achieved prior to the operative date of the board’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction regulations,
through the procedures and protocols adopted by the California Climate Action Registry under the
California Health and Safety Code section 42,823(j).  Id. at § 43,018.5(c)(5)(A).  The baseline for
calculating these emission reduction credits is the 2000 model year.  Id. at § 43,018.5(c)(5)(B).
The greenhouse gas emission reduction regulations adopted by the board also are required to “provide
an exemption for those vehicles subject to the optional low-emission vehicle standard for oxides of nitrogen
. . . for exhaust emission standards” in 13 Cal. Code Regs. § 1961(a)(9).  Id. at § 43,018.5(e).
209. Id. at § 43,018(d).
210. Deborah Keeth, Comment, The California Climate Law:  A State’s Cutting-Edge Efforts to
Achieve Clean Air, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 715, 719 (2003).
211. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43,018(i)(2) (West 2005).
212. Id. at § 43,018(a).
technological feasibility of the regulations [and] . . . the impact the regulations
may have on the economy of the state.”207  The board’s regulations also are
required to “[p]rovide flexibility, to the maximum extent feasible . . . in the
means by which a person . . . may comply with the regulations.”  The
regulations may include the use of alternative methods of compliance but not
“any mandatory trip reduction measure or land use restriction.”208  The
regulations adopted by the board cannot:  impose any additional fees or taxes
on any motor vehicle, fuel, or vehicle miles traveled; ban the sale within the
state of any category of vehicle, including sport utility vehicles and light duty
trucks; require reduction of vehicle weight; limit the speed limit on any
highway or street within the state; or limit vehicle miles traveled.209  However,
the California Climate Law “does not mandate specific reduction percentages
or overall reduction goals” for greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles.210
The state’s greenhouse gas emission reduction regulations are to be
applied to “passenger vehicle[s], light-duty truck[s], or any other vehicle[s]
determined by the state board to be a vehicle whose primary use is
noncommercial personal transportation.”211
The state board was required to adopt these regulations by January 1,
2005,212 but the regulations could not become effective before January 1,
2006, “in order to give the [California] legislature time to review the
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213. Id. at § 43,018(b)(1).
214. Id. at § 43,018.5(h).
215. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13 § 1961.1 (2006).  “Light-duty trucks from 3751 lbs. LVW-8500 lbs.
GVW that are certified to the Option 1 LEV [Low Emission Vehicle] II [Nitrogen Oxides] Standard in
section 1961(a)(1) are exempt from these greenhouse gas emission requirements . . . .”  Id. at § 1961.1(a).
The California Office of Administrative Law approved the Board’s regulations on September 15, 2005, after
reviewing them to ensure that they were consistent with the California Administrative Procedures Act.  The
regulations and Board documents relating to and explaining its regulations for greenhouse gas emissions
from motor vehicles are available at the Board’s web site, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/cc.htm.
regulations and determine whether further legislation should be enacted prior
to the effective date of the regulations.”213  However,
[i]f the federal government adopts a standard regulating a greenhouse gas from new
motor vehicles that the state board determines is in a substantially similar time frame, and
of equivalent or greater effectiveness as the regulations that would be adopted pursuant
to [the California Climate Law], the state board may elect not to adopt a standard on any
greenhouse gas included in the federal standard.214
Of course, the federal government has not adopted any such standard at the
present time.
The California Air Resources Board in 2004 adopted regulations under
the California Climate Law establishing fleet average greenhouse gas exhaust
emission standards, expressed as grams per mile carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions, for new 2009 and subsequent model year passenger cars, most light
duty trucks, and medium duty passenger vehicles.215  The regulations require
a thirty percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from tailpipes of
regulated new motor vehicles by 2016.  The regulations’ emissions limitations
encompass:  (1) emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide
emissions resulting directly from combustion of fuel during operation of a
motor vehicle; (2) emissions of carbon dioxide resulting from operation of a
vehicle’s air conditioning (A/C) system; (3) emissions of hydrofluorocarbons
refrigerant from a vehicle’s A/C system due to leakage, losses during
recharging, or release when the vehicle is scrapped at the end of its life; and
(4) upstream emissions associated with production of gasoline or diesel fuel
used by the vehicle.
The regulations establish a manufacturer fleet average emission standard
for passenger cars and the lightest trucks, and a separate manufacturer fleet
average emission standard for heavier trucks.  The regulations, which take
effect on January 1, 2006, establish near-term emission standards for model
years 2009-2012 and mid-term emission standards for the 2013-2016 model
years.  Manufacturers can comply with the regulations’ sales-weighted
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216. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000).
217. Section 209(a) further provides that “[n]o State shall require certification, inspection, or any
other approval relating to the control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine
as condition precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle, motor
vehicle engine, or equipment.”  Id.
218. In Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 541 U.S. 246,
average emissions standards for their fleet by choosing a mixture of
technologies, from among a number of cost-effective technologies identified
by the Board’s staff as available to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles.  Because the regulations’ standards are expressed in terms of
carbon dioxide equivalent grams per mile, emissions of the different types of
greenhouse gases are weighted under the regulation to account for the
differing climate change impacts of different greenhouse gases.  Upstream
emissions—emissions associated with the production of the fuel used by a
vehicle—for motor vehicles that use conventional gasoline or diesel fuels, are
used as a baseline in the regulations for comparing the relative emissions of
alternative fuel vehicles whose carbon dioxide emission values will be
appropriately adjusted.  The regulations provide manufacturers a credit for
early greenhouse gas emissions reductions in their 2000-2008 model year
vehicles that meet the 2012 model year baseline standard.  The regulations
also provide credits to motor vehicle manufacturers for alternative methods of
compliance with the regulations’ standards through projects located in the
state of California that achieve greenhouse gas emissions reductions through
increased use of alternative fuels in eligible motor vehicles.
The California greenhouse gas emission reduction regulations for new
motor vehicles may be preempted by section 209(a)216 of the Clean Air Act,
which provides that “[n]o State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt
or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from
new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to [Part A of
Subchapter II of the Clean Air Act (which regulates emissions from new
motor vehicles and fuel)].”217  The term “emissions” is not defined by either
section 209(a) or any other provision of the Clean Air Act, although section
209(a)’s reference to “emissions” when compared to section 202(a)(1)’s
reference to “emission[s] of any air pollutant” (in the context of the EPA’s
authority to set emissions standards for new motor vehicles), suggests that
section 209(a) should be interpreted broadly to preempt any state or local
government standards that regulate emissions of any substance from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, not just substances that are
considered to be “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act.218  Section 209(a)
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253 (2004), the Supreme Court stated that section 209(a) preempts state or local government standards that
require a vehicle or engine not to emit “more than a certain amount of a given pollutant” but when the
Supreme Court made this statement in that case it was not addressing the issue of whether section 209(a)
only preempts state or local government standards that regulate emissions of a substance that is an “air
pollutant” under the Clean Air Act.
219. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004).
220. Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 281, 293 (2003).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2000).
222. “If each State standard is at least as stringent as the comparable applicable Federal standard,
such State standard shall be deemed to be at least as protective of health and welfare as such Federal
standards . . . .”  Id. at § 7543(b)(2).
223. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 526-27 (2d
Cir. 1994).
224. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 18,887, 18,890
(May 3, 1984).
225. Note, California’s Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 58 N.Y.U.
preempts not only state laws and standards that compel manufacturers to meet
specified emission limits or to equip motor vehicles with a certain type of
pollution control device or design feature related to the control of emissions,
but also preempts state regulations that place restrictions on the types of motor
vehicles that a person may purchase or lease.219
However, because California is the only state that adopted standards,
other than crankcase emission standards, for the control of emissions from
new motor vehicles prior to March 30, 1966,220 the EPA Administrator is
required by section 209(b)(1)221 of the Clean Air Act to waive section 209(a)’s
preemption of state law if California determines that the state’s standards
“will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare
as applicable Federal standards.”222  As a result of this waiver provision new
motor vehicles sold in the United States either meet federal emission control
standards, promulgated under section 202 of the Clean Air Act, or California
standards for which a section 209(a) waiver has been granted.223  The EPA
Administrator has ruled that section 209(b)(1) waivers are not limited just to
California emission control standards and regulations that address California’s
smog problem, and that California’s air pollution problem does not have to be
the worst in the United States in order for a section 209(b)(1) waiver to be
granted.224
Section 209(b)(1)’s standard for a waiver permits California’s “state
standards to be considered as a ‘package’ (‘in the aggregate’), rather than by
evaluating each standard separately, and by permitting the state rather than the
[EPA] Administrator to make the determination of whether they are ‘at least
as protective.’”225  This section 209(b) waiver standard therefore “confers
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ANN. SURV. AM. L. 699, 720 (2003) (footnote omitted).
226. Id. (footnotes omitted).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2000).
228. Id. at § 7521(a).
229. Id. at § 7543(b)(1).  Section 177 of the Clean Air Act provides that, notwithstanding § 209(a)
of the Act, any state which has state implementation plan provisions approved under Part D of the Act
[dealing with non-attainment air quality control regions that do not meet the EPA national ambient air
quality standards for a particular pollutant] may adopt and enforce for any model year standards relating
to control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines if such standards are
identical to the California standards for which a waiver has been granted for such model year and California
and such state adopts such standards at least two years before the commencement of such model year.  Id.
at § 7507.
California’s emission standards for carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases from new motor
vehicles have been adopted by eight other states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont).  Sholnn Freeman, States Adopt California’s Greenhouse Gas
Limits, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2006, at D1.  Under § 177 of the Clean Air Act, the California standards can
become effective in these other states only if the EPA Administrator grants a waiver to the California
standards under § 209(b) of the Clean Air Act.
230. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 18,887, 18,889
(May 3, 1984).
231. Note, supra note 225, at 722.
232. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. at 18,890; California
State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 58 Fed. Reg. 4166 (Jan. 13, 1993).
broad discretion on the State of California, and affirms Congress’s intent to
grant California the broadest possible discretion . . . to develop an emissions
control program.”226
However, section 209(b)(1)227 provides that “[n]o such waiver shall be
granted if the [EPA] Administrator finds that the state’s determination is
arbitrary and capricious,” or if the state standards and accompanying
enforcement procedures are not consistent with section 202(a)228 of the Clean
Air Act.229  The EPA has ruled that a comparison of the relative costs and
benefits of California’s emissions control program is “not legally pertinent”
in a section 209(b) waiver proceeding.230  “The meaning of ‘compelling and
extraordinary’ is somewhat ambiguous; neither courts nor the EPA have
provided an explicit definition of this key phrase or the constraints it places
on California’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.”231  However,
the EPA, in previous proceedings considering applications by California for
waivers under section 209(b)(1), has interpreted the “compelling and
extraordinary” standard as requiring California only to “justify[] the need for
its own motor vehicle population [emissions] control program,” and not the
need for each particular standard and regulation that is part of the state’s
program.232  Furthermore, the EPA Administrator has suggested that
“compelling and extraordinary” “does not refer to levels of pollution directly,
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233. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. at 18,890.
234. Note, supra note 225, at 723.
235. Carlson, supra note 220, at 293.
236. Id.  at 297-98.
but primarily to the factors that tend to produce them:  geographical and
climatic conditions that, when combined with large numbers and high
concentrations of automobiles, create serious air pollution problems.”233  The
EPA’s interpretation of the “compelling and extraordinary” standard in section
209(b) waiver proceedings therefore has been interpreted as:
impos[ing] only a weak constraint on California’s regulatory authority.  Notably, the
Administrator has never invalidated a waiver on the grounds that California did not
demonstrate a “compelling and extraordinary” need.  Rather, California may continue to
operate its own emissions program so long as it can demonstrate that as a result of its
geography, climate, and large vehicle population its has a “compelling and extraordinary”
need to operate a separate program from the federal government.  Once California has
demonstrated the need for its own program, it may impose any regulation on greenhouse
gases that is in compliance with the other [section] 209 criteria.234
Based upon these standards, and the EPA’s previous interpretations of the
standards governing section 209(b) waivers, the EPA Administrator should be
required to issue a section 209(b) waiver to California’s greenhouse gas
emission reduction regulations for new motor vehicles if California applies for
a waiver for the regulations after determining that its state emission control
standards, including the greenhouse gas emissions control regulations, “will
be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as
applicable Federal standards.”
The EPA Administrator, however, may not grant a waiver under section
209(b)(1) to the greenhouse gas emission reduction regulations that the
California Air Resources Board recently has adopted under the California
Climate Law.  The EPA Administrator “has sometimes denied part of a waiver
[under section 209(b)(1)] or delayed implementation of California emission
standards.”235  Professor Ann E. Carlson has postulated that the EPA
Administrator under President Bush’s present administration might deny
California a section 209(b)(1) waiver for California’s greenhouse gas emission
reduction regulations for new motor vehicles, on the grounds that California’s
regulations are not “necessary to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions” (because “the hardships California could experience as a result of
rising temperatures are not so different from those faced by other states”),236
“that insufficient evidence exists to suggest that California will experience
2006] MOTOR VEHICLE GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION 41
237. Id. at 297.
238. Note, supra note 225, at 727.
239. Carlson, supra note 220, at 293.
240. Id. at 294.
241. Id.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000).
243. Id. at § 7521(a)(1).
244. Carlson, supra note 220, at 295-96 (footnotes and citations omitted).  The D.C. Circuit decision
to which Professor Carlson refers is Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1110
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The plain meaning of the statute indicates that Congress intended to make the waiver
provision coextensive with the preemption provision.”).
rising temperatures,” and “that California regulations interfere with U.S.
foreign affairs (and thus are not ‘necessary to meet compelling and
extraordinary conditions’).”237  California could argue in response that
“control of greenhouse gas emissions to slow climate change is targeted at a
‘compelling and extraordinary’ problem within California [because] . . . in
many ways California’s vulnerability to climate change impacts is tied to the
unique topographic and geographic conditions of the state.”238
Professor Carlson also has suggested that during President Bush’s second
term the EPA Administrator “will almost certainly deny California’s petition
on the ground that carbon dioxide is not an air pollutant.”239  She notes that the
term “emissions” in section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act is not defined by the
Act or the EPA regulations implementing the Act,240 and that the EPA
Administrator has “broad authority”241 under section 202242 of the Clean Air
Act to establish “standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from
any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.”243
Professor Carlson explains that despite section 209(b)(1)’s waiver provision,
the EPA Administrator:
[n]evertheless . . . may argue that since . . . carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas
emissions are not air pollutants under the [Clean Air Act], California may not regulate
greenhouse gases under the waiver provision.  The argument would be that the waiver
provision only allows California to regulate emissions as long as the emission regulations
are “at least as protective . . .  as applicable Federal standards.”  Because the federal
government does not, and under the Bush Administration’s analysis cannot, regulate
greenhouse gas emissions (most significantly carbon dioxide), the argument would
conclude that California cannot regulate such emissions (because there are no applicable
federal standards), and therefore that the California regulations are subject to the broad
[Clean Air Act] preemption provision.  The D.C. Circuit has held that California’s power
to regulate emissions is co-extensive with the EPA’s power to regulate:  power under
Section 209(b), in other words, is identical to the EPA’s power contained in section
209(a).  If the D.C. Circuit is correct, the EPA could argue that as long as it lacks
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, so does California.244
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Professor Carlson suggests that “California could counter that if the EPA
cannot regulate greenhouse gas emissions, then no state is prohibited from
issuing motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions standards, and that California
need not apply for a Section 209(b) waiver.”245  She adds that the EPA might
respond that section 209(a)’s preemption provision “prohibits states from
regulating ‘emissions’ from mobile sources without qualification, suggesting
that states cannot regulate greenhouse gas emissions or any other
emissions.”246  As noted earlier,247 this argument would be supported by
comparing section 209(a)’s reference to “emissions” to section 202(a)(1)’s
reference to “emission[s] of any air pollutant” and concluding from this
comparison that section 209(a) preempts any state standard regulating
emissions of any substance, not just an “air pollutant,” from new motor
vehicles.  Professor Carlson suggests that California, in rebuttal, could note
that the term “emissions” in section 209(a) is not defined by the Clean Air Act
or by EPA regulations implementing the Act, and that:
1) the EPA [under section 202(a)] is given authority to control “emissions of air
pollutants,” 2) the term “air pollutants” does not include greenhouse gas emissions, and
3) the preemption section therefore does not apply to greenhouse gas emissions . . . and
California . . . need not apply for a waiver under [section 209(b)(1) of the Clean Air
Act].248
However, a court more likely will hold that section 209(a) preempts any
state standard relating to the control of emissions of any substance (including
greenhouse gases) from new motor vehicles (because section 209(a) refers to
preemption of any state standard relating to emissions, not just state standards
relating to emissions of air pollutants), but that the EPA Administrator can
grant a waiver under section 209(b)(1) to California’s greenhouse gas
emissions reduction regulations for new motor vehicles.
Even if the California greenhouse gas emissions reduction regulations are
not preempted by section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act (either because section
209(a) is held to be inapplicable to the California regulations or because the
EPA Administrator under section 209(b)(1) grants a waiver from section
209(a) preemption), the California greenhouse gas emissions reduction
regulations may be preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
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250. Id.  The regulations are being challenged in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep Inc. v. Witherspoon,
E.D. Cal., CV-F-04-6663, on the grounds that greenhouse gases are not “air pollutants” that can be
regulated by California under the Clean Air Act and that the California standards are preempted by the
EPCA’s fuel economy standards.  Mike Ferullo, Climate Change:  Lawsuits Against California Auto
Standards for Carbon Dioxide May Proceed, Court Says, BNA Toxic Law Daily, Oct. 27, 2005, at
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/tld.nsf/is/A0B1W5W8Z5.
251. Keeth, supra note 210, at 725.
252. See infra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
253. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2000).
254. Passenger Automobile Average Fuel Economy Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 531.5(a) (2006).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 32,901(a)(10) (2000).
256. Carlson, supra note 220, at 290-91.
257. Light Truck Fuel Economy Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 533.5(a) (2006); Light Truck Average Fuel
Economy Standards Model Years 2005-2007, 68 Fed. Reg. 16,868 (Apr. 7, 2003).  On August 23, 2005,
the NHTSA proposed higher CAFE standards for most light trucks beginning with model years 2008-11.
Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks; Model Years 2008-2011, 70 Fed. Reg. 51,414
(EPCA),249 which provides that “when an average fuel economy standard . . .
is in effect [under the EPCA], a State or a political subdivision of a State may
not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or
average fuel economy standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel
economy standard [under the EPCA].”250  “There is no exception to this
preemption, even for California,”251 although, as discussed later,252 this EPCA
preemption provision does not invalidate the state of California’s new motor
vehicle emissions regulations that have been granted a waiver by the EPA
Administrator under section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act.  
Under the EPCA, the Department of Transportation has established
corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for passenger automobiles
and light duty trucks (but not for heavy duty trucks), which establish the
average minimum performance standard for vehicle miles traveled per gallon
of fuel for all of the models of passenger cars and light duty trucks
manufactured by a particular automobile manufacturer for a particular model
year.  The Secretary of Transportation is required by the EPCA to set the
CAFE standard at the maximum feasible level, taking into “consider[ation]
technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor
vehicle standards of the [Federal] Government on fuel economy, and the need
of the United States to conserve energy.”253  At the present time, the CAFE
standard for passenger automobiles is 27.5 miles per gallon of gasoline254 (“or
equivalent amount of other fuel”255), a standard that has not changed since
1986.256  The CAFE standard for light duty trucks is 21.0 miles per gallon of
gasoline for model year 2005, 21.6 miles per gallon for model year 2006, and
22.2 miles per gallon for model year 2007.257
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258. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,929
(Sept. 8, 2003) (EPA Administrator’s denial of petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under section
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act).  “[A] more fuel-efficient vehicle emits less [carbon dioxide] per mile
traveled in direct proportion to the increase in its fuel efficiency.”  Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Comment,
California’s Global Warming Bill, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 893, 924 (2003).
259. Giovinazzo, supra note 258, at 924.
260. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,925.
261. Giovinazzo, supra note 258, at 924.
California’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction regulations probably will
require new motor vehicles to achieve greater fuel economy in order to reduce
their emissions of greenhouse gases to the extent required by the regulations,
because “[n]o technology currently exists or is under development that can
capture and destroy or reduce emissions of [carbon dioxide] . . . from motor
vehicle tailpipes.  At present, the only practical way to reduce tailpipe
emissions of [carbon dioxide] is to improve fuel economy.”258
Although California’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction regulations
under the California Climate Law avoid clear preemption by the EPCA’s
CAFE standards by not explicitly specifying fuel economy standards (e.g.,
average miles per gallon requirements) for new motor vehicles, the California
regulations may be preempted by the EPCA’s CAFE standards because the
California regulations probably will require motor vehicle manufacturers to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions principally by reducing carbon dioxide
emissions by improving the fuel economy of their new motor vehicles.  “Since
directly regulating fuel economy would create tension with EPCA’s
preemption clause, California . . . instead require[s] manufacturers [of new
motor vehicles] to install a range of technological measures that result in
reduced [carbon dioxide] emissions, without specifying fuel economy
targets.”259  Such technological improvements might include:  engine
improvements such as improved specific power and gasoline direct injection;
improved transmissions, such as 5- and 6-speed automatic transmissions,
5-speed motorized manual gearshifts, and continuously variable transmissions;
integrated starter generators that shut off idling engines; and hybrid electric
drive trains.260  However, because methods to reduce carbon dioxide emissions
“directly relate to fuel efficiency,” since reduction of carbon dioxide
emissions makes a motor vehicle more fuel efficient,261 the EPCA may
preempt and invalidate California’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction
regulations because the regulations will require reduction of greenhouse gas
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265. E.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1992) (interpreting a
provision of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 which provides that federal law expressly preempts state
laws “relating to rates, routes, or services of airlines”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
739 (1985) (interpreting a provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) that
preempts states’ laws which “relate to” employee benefit plans subject to the ERISA).
emissions from new motor vehicles primarily by methods or measures that
increase a vehicle’s fuel efficiency/economy.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), in
commentary accompanying its recent proposed revised CAFE standards for
light duty trucks, has stated that “[a] state law that seeks to reduce motor
vehicle carbon dioxide emissions is both expressly and impliedly preempted”
by the EPCA.262  The NHTSA reasons that “since the way to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions [from motor vehicles] is to improve fuel economy, a state
regulation seeking to reduce those emissions is a ‘regulation related to fuel
economy standards or average fuel economy standards’ within the meaning of
[the EPCA’s preemption provision].”263  This interpretation of the EPCA by
the NHTSA probably is not entitled to deference by a court under the Chevron
doctrine, even if it is a reasonable interpretation by an administrative agency
of an ambiguous federal statute, because this interpretation is not presented in
a formal agency regulation that was subject to public notice and comment or
a formal adjudication decision.264  However, the NHTSA expresses the legal
theory upon which the federal government probably will rely in trying to have
the EPCA preempt and invalidate the California carbon dioxide emissions
reduction regulations for new motor vehicles.
The NHTSA’s interpretation of the EPCA’s preemption provision
arguably is supported by some decisions265 of the United States Supreme
Court, interpreting provisions in other federal statutes that provide that
specified federal laws preempt state laws “relating” to specific matters, which
support an interpretation of the EPCA’s preemption clause under which
46 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. [Vol. 1:1
266. Giovinazzo, supra note 258, at 929.
267. Id. at 929-32.
268. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645
(1995); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
269. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
270. Giovinazzo, supra note 258, at 929-53.
271. Id. at 948-50.  This argument is premised in part upon the fact that the “EPCA defined ‘federal
standards’ to include both national motor vehicle standards as well as ‘emissions standards applicable by
reason of section 209(b),’ the waiver provision of the [Clean Air Act].”  Id. at 949 (citing Energy Policy
and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 502(d)(3)(D)(I-ii), 89 Stat. 871, 905 (1975)).
272. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4) (2000).
“California is broadly preempted from promulgating regulations related to fuel
economy standards regardless of the CAA waiver.”266
On the other hand, one commentator267 has argued that more recent
Supreme Court decisions,268 interpreting the preemption provision269 in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (which provides
that the ERISA preempts any state law which “relate[s] to any employee
benefit plan” subject to the ERISA), support an interpretation of section
209(b) of the Clean Air Act and the EPCA’s preemption provisions under
which California’s greenhouse gas emission reduction regulations for new
motor vehicles, for which EPA has granted a waiver under section 209(b) of
the Clean Air Act, would not be preempted by the EPCA’s preemption
provision that bans state laws relating to fuel economy.270  One basis for this
argument is that if the EPA Administrator grants a waiver under section
209(b) of the Clean Air Act to California greenhouse gas emissions reduction
regulations, the California regulations would be a federal standard for
purposes of the EPCA, not a state standard or law subject to preemption under
the EPCA.271  This argument is a sound one, and should be the basis for
rejection of the NHTSA’s interpretation of the EPCA’s preemption provision
if the EPA grants a Clean Air Act section 209(b) waiver to California’s
greenhouse gas emissions reduction regulations.  However, the EPCA
preemption provision may invalidate the California greenhouse gas emissions
reduction regulations if the EPA Administrator does not grant a waiver for
such regulations under section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act.
IV.  STATE REGULATION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM IN-USE
ON-ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES
Subject to specified Clean Air Act preemption provisions (including
section 209(a) and section 211(c)(4)272 which generally preempt state and
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276. Metro Systems Corp. v. City of New York, 12 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1822 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
277. “Cars are designed to drive most efficiently at around 60 m.p.h.; efficiency drops 7% to 23%
for every 5 m.p.h. over that.”  Lisa Takeuchi Cullen, How to Save $$$ Now, TIME, Oct. 31, 2005, at 64.
Consequently, cars driven over 60 m.p.h. on highways will burn more gasoline per distance traveled than
at 60 m.p.h. and therefore will emit more carbon dioxide per distance traveled at such higher speeds.
278. California’s General Assembly has prohibited the California Air Resources Board from
local government controls or prohibitions of characteristics or components of
motor vehicle fuels or fuel additives for purposes of motor vehicle emission
control), section 116273 of the Clean Air Act provides that nothing in the Clean
Air Act:
shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or
enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any
requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution; except that if an emission
standard or limitation is in effect under an applicable implementation plan or under
section 111 or 112 of [the Clean Air Act], such State or political subdivision may not
adopt or enforce any emission standard or limitation which is less stringent than the
standard or limitation under such plan or section.274
Consequently, because section 209(a) only prohibits a state or political
subdivision from adopting or attempting to enforce a standard relating to the
control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines,
the Clean Air Act does not preclude a state or local government from
imposing its own emission control standards upon an in-use on-road motor
vehicle upon resale or re-registration of the vehicle after the formerly new
motor vehicle is passed on to the ultimate consumer purchaser.275  Following
registration of a formerly new motor vehicle by the ultimate consumer
purchaser, the vehicle is no longer a “new” motor vehicle under the Clean Air
Act and section 209(a) “lapses by its own terms.”276
Relying upon this authority under section 116 to regulate emissions of air
pollutants from in-use on-road motor vehicles, a state might seek to control
greenhouse gas emissions from those vehicles by reducing the maximum
permissible speed on highways277 or by placing restrictions on the miles that
a particular motor vehicle could travel, such as permitting a particular motor
vehicle to be driven on commuter roads and highways only three or four
weekdays per week.  However, either of these types of restrictions might be
opposed by large numbers of members of the public.278
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281. Frame Factory, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 583 P.2d 660, 663 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).  A state or
local government also is not preempted by section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act from setting its own
standards for the licensing of motor vehicles for commercial use within the government’s territory.  Allway
Taxi, Inc., 340 F. Supp. at 1124.
282. As discussed supra note 26 and accompanying text, section 202(a)(1) emissions standards are
applicable to motor vehicles and engines for their useful life.
A state or local government is not preempted by section 209(a) of the
Clean Air Act from requiring older in-use on-road vehicles to be retrofitted to
become equipped with emission control devices which comply with specified
Clean Air Act emission control standards for later model new motor
vehicles.279  A state or local government also is not preempted by the Clean
Air Act from requiring an owner of an in-use on-road motor vehicle from
insuring the installation and upkeep of federally required Clean Air Act
emission control devices in the motor vehicle.280  Section 209(a) also does not
preempt a state law that makes it illegal for a person to remove, from an in-use
on-road motor vehicle, pollution control equipment (such as a catalytic
converter) required by Clean Air Act emission control requirements.281
Consequently, if the EPA Administrator in the future should adopt
emission standards for carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases for new
motor vehicles or engines under section 202(a)(1), a state or local government
would not be preempted by the Clean Air Act from adopting standards
requiring owners of motor vehicles subject to such EPA section 202(a)(1)
greenhouse gas emission standards to have their vehicles:  1) periodically
inspected to determine if the motor vehicles’ emissions of greenhouse gases
are in compliance with the EPA’s section 202(a)(1) emissions standards, both
during the vehicle’s useful life282 and thereafter; and 2) to require a vehicle
that failed the EPA’s section 202(a)(1) standards (or a stricter standard
adopted by the state for in-use on road motor vehicles) to be repaired in order
to comply with the applicable emissions standards.  The Clean Air Act also
would not preempt a state or local government from requiring an older model
motor vehicle, that is not subject to any EPA section 202(a)(1) greenhouse gas
emissions standards, to be retrofitted in order to comply with the EPA section
202(a)(1) greenhouse gases emissions standards or state greenhouse gases
emissions standards for in-use on-road motor vehicles.
A state or local government is prohibited by the Clean Air Act from
imposing its own emission control standards upon a motor vehicle “the
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moment after the new motor vehicle is bought and registered.”283  A state is
precluded by section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act from imposing state
standards or penalties upon a manufacturer of new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines for producing a motor vehicle engine that is designed
to circumvent Clean Air Act emissions standards for new motor vehicles or
new engines because section 209(a) preempts a state from seeking to impose
state penalties to provide a manufacturer with an incentive to comply with the
federal standards.284  Consequently, if the EPA Administrator in the future
does adopt a greenhouse gases emissions standard for new motor vehicles and
engines under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, a state or local
government could not seek to impose sanctions or penalties under state law
upon a manufacturer who produced a new motor vehicle or engine that emits
greenhouse gas emissions in amounts that violate the EPA’s section 202(a)(1)
standard.
However, even if a state or local government standard to regulate carbon
dioxide emissions from in-road in-use motor vehicles is not preempted by the
Clean Air Act, such a state or local government standard may be preempted
by the provision285 of the EPCA that prohibits any state or local government
from adopting a law or regulation “related to fuel economy standards or
average fuel economy standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel
economy standard under this chapter.”286  This preemption provision makes
no distinction between state standards for new motor vehicles and state
standards for in-use on-road motor vehicles, although one could argue that the
provision’s reference to “automobiles covered by an average fuel economy
standard under this chapter” implicitly refers only to new motor vehicles
covered by a CAFE standard issued under the EPCA.  However, if this EPCA
preemption provision is held applicable to state standards for both new motor
vehicles and in-use on-road motor vehicles, any state or local government
regulation seeking to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from an in-use on-road
motor vehicles would be preempted by the EPCA, because such a regulation
would have to seek to reduce a vehicle’s carbon dioxide emissions by
increasing the vehicle’s fuel efficiency.  Such a state or local government
regulation therefore probably would be held to “relate to fuel economy” and
to be preempted by the EPCA under analysis similar to that which would be
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290. The EPA Administrator in his decision to deny the petition to set standards under section
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act for greenhouse gases emissions from new motor vehicles and new motor
vehicle engines stated that greenhouse gases (including carbon dioxide) “are not air pollutants under the
[Clean Air Act’s] regulatory provisions, including sections 108, 109, 111, 112, and 202.”  Control of
Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,928 (Sept. 8, 2003).  During
the summer of 2003, the EPA Administrator denied a petition filed by eleven states to list carbon dioxide
as a criteria pollutant under section 108 of the Clean Air Act.  David R. Hodes, State Law Responses to
Global Warming, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 53, 56 (2003).  Janine Maney argues that the EPA Administrator
has a non-discretionary duty under section 108 of the Clean Air Act to list carbon dioxide as a criteria
pollutant under section 108.  Janine Maney, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Climate Change, and the Clean
Air Act, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 298, 376 (2005).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2000).
292. Id. at § 7410(a)(1) & (2)(A).
followed for state or local government requirements to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions from new motor vehicles and engines.287
Because the present EPA Administrator has decided that greenhouse
gases (including carbon dioxide) are not air pollutants under the Clean Air Act
and therefore cannot be criteria air pollutants under section 108(a),288 for
which a national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) has to be established
under section 109289 of the Clean Air Act,290 state governments are not
currently required to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide from stationary and
mobile sources (including motor vehicles) under section 110291 of the Clean
Air Act.  If the EPA in the future does establish a section 109 NAAQS for
carbon dioxide, each state would have to add provisions to their section 110
Clean Air Act implementation plan(s) to control emissions of carbon dioxide
from stationary and mobile sources as necessary to attain and maintain the
NAAQS for carbon dioxide.292  The extent to which a section 110 state
implementation plan, for a particular air quality control region, would have to
regulate emissions of carbon dioxide from in-use on-road motor vehicles
operating within the region, would depend upon particular characteristics of
each air quality control region subject to a section 110 state implementation
plan, including the level of concentrations of carbon dioxide in the ambient air
of that region compared to the maximum concentrations of carbon dioxide
permitted by the EPA’s NAAQS for carbon dioxide, the amounts of carbon
dioxide emitted into the region’s ambient air by stationary sources (including
fossil-fuel burning electric utility generating plants) located within the region,
the amount of carbon dioxide emitted into the region’s ambient air by in-use
on-road motor vehicles operating within the region, and the amount of carbon
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dioxide that is emitted by stationary sources and motor vehicles operating
outside the region that is transported into the particular air quality control
region.
If section 109 NAAQS are established for carbon dioxide, and if the EPA
Administrator establishes carbon dioxide emission standards for new motor
vehicles under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, then each state might
have to add to their section 110 state implementation plan(s) provisions
requiring inspection and maintenance programs for in-use on-road vehicles.
 Such inspection/maintenance programs, which presently are required to be
present in section 110 state implementation plans for ozone non-attainment
areas,293 would require each motor vehicle registered in a particular air quality
control region to be tested periodically to determine if the vehicle is in
compliance with the section 202(a)(1) carbon dioxide emission standards for
the useful life of the vehicle and would require necessary repairs (up to a
specified dollar amount) of the vehicle if the vehicle violates the section
202(a)(1) standard during its useful life.294  However, such an inspection/
maintenance program only would be required if necessary to attain and
maintain the carbon dioxide NAAQS in a particular air quality control region.
If such section 110 state implementation plan provisions are approved by the
EPA Administrator, or if such plan provisions are imposed upon a state by the
EPA Administrator under section 110(c)(1)295 as a Federal implementation
plan, these plan provisions should be considered federal regulations that are
not subject to preemption under the EPCA.296
The EPA Administrator, however, opposes both the listing of carbon
dioxide as a criteria pollutant under section 108 of the Clean Air Act and state
regulation of carbon dioxide emissions under section 110 implementation
plans, because concentrations of carbon dioxide in the earth’s atmosphere are
fairly uniform throughout the world, requiring worldwide programs involving
carbon dioxide emissions controls by all nations in order to be effective:297
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Such a situation would be inconsistent with a basic underlying premise of the [Clean Air
Act] regime for implementation of a NAAQS—that actions taken by individual states and
by EPA can generally bring all areas of the U.S. into attainment of a NAAQS.  The
statutory NAAQS implementation regime is fundamentally inadequate when it comes to
a substance like [carbon dioxide], which is emitted globally and has relatively
homogenous concentrations around the world.  A NAAQS for [carbon dioxide], unlike
any pollutant for which a NAAQS has been established, could not be attained by any area
of the U.S. until such a standard were attained by the entire world as a result of emission
controls implemented in countries around the world.298
However, state programs, under section 110 implementation plans to
control carbon dioxide emissions from both stationary and mobile sources,
would fulfill at least part of the duties of the United States under the Climate
Change Framework Convention (which the United States has ratified) and the
Kyoto Protocol (which the United States has signed but not ratified).  At the
very least, the respect and cooperation extended to the United States by other
nations should significantly improve if the United States significantly reduces
this nation’s emissions of carbon dioxide from motor vehicles and stationary
sources, as a result of EPA promulgation of carbon dioxide emission standards
for new motor vehicles per section 202(a)(1), and of controls of carbon
dioxide emissions under section 110 state implementation plans.
V.  EPA REGULATION OF EMISSIONS OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS
FROM NEW MOTOR VEHICLES
Because greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and
hydrofluorocarbons) presently are not listed as hazardous air pollutants under
section 112(b)(1)299 of the Clean Air Act, and the present EPA Administrator
has stated300 that greenhouse gases are not “air pollutants” under the Clean Air
Act’s regulatory provisions in section 112 for hazardous air pollutants, the
present EPA Administrator probably will not establish regulations under
section 202(l)(2)301 that would require control of greenhouse gas emissions as
hazardous air pollutant emissions from motor vehicles and motor vehicle
fuels.
Section 202(l)(2) of the Clean Air Act required the EPA Administrator,
by May 15, 1995, to promulgate regulations, under section 202(a)(1)302 or
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section 211(c)(1),303 “containing reasonable requirements to control hazardous
air pollutants from motor vehicles and motor vehicle fuel.”  Although this
provision refers to “motor vehicles” rather than to “new motor vehicles” (as
is the case in section 202(a)(2)), the EPA Administrator has interpreted
section 202(l)(2) as only giving him authority to adopt regulations to control
hazardous air pollutant emissions from new motor vehicles and as not giving
him authority to promulgate hazardous air pollutant emission regulations for
in-use on-road motor vehicles.304  A panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has upheld this EPA interpretation of
section 202(l)(2), stating that “we cannot read § 202(l)(2)’s omission of the
word ‘new’ as carte blanche to regulate in-use vehicles in connection with
toxics.”305
Section 202(l)(2) as drafted authorizes the EPA Administrator to control
emissions of hazardous air pollutants from motor vehicles solely through
regulations issued under section 211(c)(1) that control fuels and fuel additives
to protect public health or welfare, although under section 202(l)(2) the EPA
Administrator probably could control emissions of hazardous air pollutants
from new motor vehicles both through section 202(a)(1) emissions standards
and through section 211(c)(1) regulations controlling fuels and fuel additives.
These regulations under section 202(l)(2), which are required, at a
minimum, to apply to emissions of benzene and formaldehyde, “shall not be
inconsistent with standards under [section 202(a)]” and “shall contain
standards for such fuels or vehicles, or both, which the [EPA] Administrator
determines reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable
through the application of technology which will be available, taking into
consideration the standards established under [section 202(a)(1)], the
availability and costs of the technology, and noise, energy, and safety factors,
and lead time.”306
Although section 202(l)(2) states that regulations issued under its
directives shall apply at a minimum to emissions of benzene and
formaldehyde, section 202(l)(2) does not define “hazardous air pollutants” for
purposes of its requirements.  Although section 112(a)(6)307 defines
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“hazardous air pollutant” as any air pollutant listed pursuant to 112(b)(1)308
(which presently lists 188 substances as “hazardous air pollutants”) or which
the EPA Administrator has listed under section 112(b)(2) or (3)309 of the Clean
Air Act,310 a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has held that “this definition applies only ‘for purposes’ of § [112]
itself (except for subsection (r)), and has no bearing on the term as it appears
in § 202(l)(2).”311  The EPA’s present position is that “hazardous air
pollutants” for purposes of section 202(l)(2) “are those pollutants known or
suspected to cause cancer or other serious health or environmental effects”312
and that section 202(a)(1) allows it to address air pollution that impacts health
or welfare.313  The EPA’s initial regulatory efforts under section 202(l)(2),
however, are focused on 21 compounds, including benzene and formaldehyde,
that are known or suspected to cause cancer or other serious health effects,
although “[a]dditional compounds may be added in the future due to their
ecological impacts, material damage, or visibility impairment.”314
Because the present EPA Administrator has declined to list greenhouse
gases as hazardous air pollutants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, he
probably also will decline to list them as “hazardous air pollutants” under
section 202(l)(2).  Section 112(b)(2)315 states that the EPA Administrator
“shall periodically . . . where appropriate, revise [the] list [of hazardous air
pollutants established by section 112(b)] by rule, adding pollutants which
present, or may present, through inhalation or other routes of exposure, a
threat of adverse human health effects . . . or adverse environmental effects
whether through ambient concentrations, bioaccumulation, deposition, or
otherwise, but not including [accidental] releases under [section 112(r)].”  The
greenhouse gas hydrofluorocarbons cannot be listed as a section 112
hazardous air pollutant “solely due to its adverse effects on the environment”
because hydrofluorocarbons are substances regulated under subchapter VI
[ozone depleting substances] of the Clean Air Act.316  However, this
prohibition does not apply to the listing of hydrofluorocarbons as “hazardous
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air pollutants” under section 202(l)(2).  Section 112 also provides that no air
pollutant which is listed as a criteria pollutant under section 108(a) can be
listed as a hazardous air pollutant under section 112, although that prohibition
does “not apply to any pollutant which independently meets the listing criteria
of [section 112(b)(2)] and is a precursor to a pollutant which is listed under
section 108(a) or to any pollutant which is in a class of pollutants listed under
such section.”  This latter provision of section 112 should be interpreted to
mean that the greenhouse gas nitrous oxides could be listed as a section 112
hazardous air pollutant even though oxides of nitrogen is listed as a criteria
pollutant under section 108(a).  In any case, this prohibition as to listing under
section 112 would not be applicable to the listing of nitrous oxides as a
hazardous air pollutant under section 202(l)(2) of the Clean Air Act.
Although greenhouse gases (including carbon dioxide) probably might
not be found to present a threat of adverse health effects as a result of their
contributions to global warming and climate change, they might well be found
to present a threat of adverse environmental effects due to their contributions
to global warming and climate change.  This would justify listing them as
hazardous air pollutants under either section 202(l)(2) or section 112 on the
basis of the threat of their causing adverse environmental effects.  Section
112(b)(3)(B) provides:
The Administrator shall add a substance to the list upon a showing by [a] petitioner or
on the Administrator’s own determination that the substance is an air pollutant and that
emissions, ambient concentrations, bioaccumulation or deposition of the substance are
known to cause or reasonably may be anticipated to cause adverse effects to human
health or adverse environmental effects.317
After the EPA Administrator was sued for failing to promulgate
regulations under section 202(l)(2) to control emissions of hazardous air
pollutants from motor vehicles by May 15, 1995, as required by section
202(l)(2) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA Administrator, pursuant to a consent
decree, issued regulations in March 2001318 to control the emissions of
hazardous air pollutants from motor vehicles under section 202(l)(2).  In
commentary accompanying these regulations, the EPA Administrator noted
that emissions of air toxics from “a wide variety of mobile sources” already
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have been reduced by “many of the emission control programs put in place
pursuant to the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments:”319
These include our reformulated gasoline (RFG) program, which has substantially reduced
mobile source air toxics, particularly in urban areas which often have high levels of
ambient air toxics, our national low emission vehicle (NLEV) program, our Tier 2 motor
vehicle emissions standards and gasoline sulfur control requirements, and standards for
nonroad vehicles and equipment, such as locomotives, recreational marine engines, and
aircraft.  We have also proposed heavy-duty engine and vehicle standards and on-
highway diesel fuel sulfur control requirements that would reduce toxics emissions from
heavy-duty trucks.  Finally, certain other mobile source control programs have been
specifically aimed at reducing toxics emissions from mobile sources (e.g., our lead phase-
out program).
While these mobile source standards were put in place primarily to reduce ambient
concentrations of criteria pollutants through oxides of nitrogen . . . , volatile organic
compound[s] . . . , carbon monoxide . . . and particulate matter . . . controls, and thereby
to help states and localities come into attainment with the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards . . . for ozone, [particulate matter], and [carbon monoxide], they have reduced
and will continue to reduce the levels of on-highway emissions of air toxics significantly.
By 2020, we project these programs will reduce the levels of on-highway emissions of
benzene by 73 percent, formaldehyde by 76 percent, 1,3-butadiene by 72 percent, and
acetaldehyde by 67 percent from 1990 levels.320
Some of these section 202(l)(2) regulations adopted in March 2001,
promulgated under section 211(c)(1)321 to regulate motor vehicle fuels and
fuel additives, impose an “anti-backsliding” requirement upon fuel refineries
and importers that mandates that they maintain current levels of controls of
toxic and hazardous substances in motor vehicle gasoline that exceed the
levels of controls required by the EPA’s present regulations.322  However,
these regulations “do not require [gasoline] refiners to install new equipment
or use technologies beyond what they were using in the baseline period (1998-
2000).”323
Furthermore, these regulations do not impose any new requirements for
control of emissions of hazardous air pollutants from motor vehicles, although
one of the adopted regulations states, in part, that:
no later than July 1, 2003, the Administrator shall propose any requirements to control
hazardous air pollutants from motor vehicles and motor vehicle fuels that the
Administrator determines are appropriate pursuant to section 202(l)(2) of the [Clean Air]
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Act.  The Administrator will take final action on such proposal no later than July 1,
2004.324
In commentary accompanying these regulations, the EPA Administrator listed
twenty-one mobile source air toxics, including benzene and formaldehyde (but
not any of the greenhouse gases), emitted by motor vehicles, that are known
or suspected to cause cancer or other serious health effects, as potential
hazardous air pollutants whose emissions might be regulated under section
202(l)(2) standards.325
The EPA stated that it was not establishing new standards to regulate
emissions of hazardous air pollutants from motor vehicles at that time because
it had “determined that [the EPA’s] proposed and current control programs for
[volatile organic compounds] and diesel [particulate matter] emissions from
motor vehicles will achieve the greatest degree of [motor vehicle hazardous
air pollutant emissions] control that is feasible when cost and other relevant
factors are considered.”326
After these regulations were upheld by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia,327 the EPA failed to propose or
promulgate any regulations by the deadlines specified in the regulation.328  A
federal district court subsequently held that the “plain language” of this EPA
regulation under section 202(l)(2) “create[s] a nondiscretionary duty requiring
the Administrator to act by specified dates,”329 “to either affirmatively act or
decide that no action was needed,”330 and that the EPA Administrator’s failure
to perform this nondiscretionary duty could be challenged in a citizen suit
brought under section 304(a)(2)331 of the Clean Air Act.332
In response to this decision, the EPA recently entered into a consent
decree in which it has agreed to promulgate, by February 9, 2007, regulations
under section 202(l)(2) to limit emissions of twenty-one hazardous air
pollutants, including benzene, formaldehyde, and 1,3 butadiene, from new
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motor vehicles.333  The consent decree does not specify the extent to which
these new regulations will control hazardous air pollutant emissions from new
motor vehicles through section 202(a)(1) emissions standards for new motor
vehicles, as opposed to section 211(c)(1) fuel and fuel additive regulations.
At the present time, the EPA has no plans to regulate emissions from new
motor vehicles of carbon dioxide or any other greenhouse gases under either
section 202(a)(1) or section 202(l)(2) of the Clean Air Act.
VI.  STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMEN T REGULATION OF EMISSIONS OF
HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS FROM MOTOR VEHICLES
States and their political subdivisions are preempted by section 209(a)334
of the Clean Air Act from adopting or attempting to enforce any standard
relating to the control of emissions of hazardous air pollutants from new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, although the EPA Administrator would
have the authority under section 209(b)335 to grant the state of California a
waiver of this preemption.  If California was granted such a waiver, another
state which has section 110 state implementation plan provisions approved
under the provisions of Part D of the Clean Air Act for nonattainment areas
would be permitted to adopt hazardous air pollutant standards for a particular
model year’s new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines if the
standards are identical to California standards for which a waiver has been
granted.336
Section 116337 of the Clean Air Act would authorize a state or political
subdivision of a state to adopt and enforce standards or limitations for control
of emissions of hazardous air pollutants from in-use on-road motor vehicles.
VII.  CONCLUSION
The EPA Administrator should reverse his ruling that carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases are not “air pollutants” whose emissions can be
regulated under the Clean Air Act.  Furthermore, the EPA Administrator
should proceed to issue regulations under either section 202(a)(1) or section
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202(l)(2) of the Clean Air Act to reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle
engines.  These regulations could be fuel economy standards that are stricter
than the present CAFE standards under the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act, but also could be standards identical to, or modeled after, California’s
greenhouse gases emission reduction regulations for new motor vehicles.  In
addition, the EPA Administrator should grant a waiver under section
209(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act so that these California state regulations will
not be preempted by either section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act or by the
CAFE standards of the EPCA.
Regardless of whether the EPA Administrator takes these actions under
the Clean Air Act to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines, the EPA
Administrator should proceed to adopt regulations under section 202(l)(2) of
the Clean Air Act to reduce emissions of toxic and hazardous air pollutants
from new motor vehicles, and states should consider adoption of reasonable
regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from in-use on-road motor
vehicles.
